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INTRODUCTION
Undocumented immigrant youth are helping define the contours of Ameri-
can citizenship. The Development, Relief, and Education for Minors Act, or
“DREAM Act,”1 would put them on a path to citizenship, but the impact of the
movement seeking passage of the law has consequences for how society views
immigration reform and citizenship more broadly, narrowing the standards for
who is deemed worthy of citizenship. This article examines how the DREAM
movement is both a product of America’s changing views on citizenship and a
potential indication of where those views are headed, for better and for worse.
There is much to be celebrated about the ways in which the DREAM
movement breaks radically from the history of immigrants and citizenship,
which is a history dominated by overt racial exclusion. Contrasting with that
history, the DREAMers—represented by youth from virtually every corner of
the globe—are claiming their American identity as well as the right to a path to
formal citizenship status. There is cause for concern, however, in how the
movement has put forward a strategy of citizenship based on worthiness—ele-
vating the best, the brightest, and the blameless—with costs both within the
world of immigration and outside it. The standards for who is deemed worthy
of citizenship are narrowing, reflecting an increasing intolerance of imperfec-
1 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011 or DREAM Act of
2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011); Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors Act of 2011 or DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011); Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010 or DREAM Act of 2010, H.R. 6497,
111th Cong. § 1 (2010); Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010
or DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010); Development, Relief, and Educa-
tion for Alien Minors Act of 2010 or DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3963, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010);
Citizenship and Service Act of 2010, H.R. 6327, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010); Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010 or DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3827, 111th
Cong. § 1 (2010); American Dream Act, H.R. 1751, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009); Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2009 or DREAM Act of 2009, S. 729, 111th
Cong. § 1 (2009); Mariela Olivares, The Impact of Recessionary Politics on Latino-Ameri-
can and Immigrant Families: SCHIP Success and DREAM Act Failure, 55 HOW. L.J. 359,
377-82 (2012); see generally Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act
and the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1757 (2009) [hereinafter Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM
Act].
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tion. This narrowing shows up well beyond the traditional scope of immigration
and citizenship discourse, and connects with efforts to disenfranchise voters
through felon-disenfranchisement and voter-identification laws.
DREAMers take their name from the DREAM Act, legislation which has
been introduced in Congress every year since 2001 without ever passing both
chambers.2 Specifically, the bill creates a path to citizenship3 for youth who
came to the United States before the age of sixteen, who are still below the age
of thirty-five, who have resided in the United States for at least five years, who
completed high school (or equivalent schooling, like a GED), and who enroll in
either an institution of higher learning or the military.4 The individuals must
also possess “good moral character,” a term of art in immigration law that bars
eligibility for almost anyone with a criminal conviction, even a minor one.5
These eligibility criteria for immigration relief under the DREAM Act reveal
how its proponents view who is most worthy of legal immigration status and,
ultimately, citizenship. This vision sets a very high standard, one with little
tolerance for any but the most minor criminal or immigration-related violations.
The DREAM movement—with its “coming out” tours, dramatic cross-
country walks to raise support for the bill, and countless rallies across the coun-
try6—lives at and vividly illustrates the disjuncture between American citizen-
ship as a formal legal status (something DREAMers clearly lack) and
citizenship as American identity (something DREAMers have in abundance).
This disjuncture helps give the DREAMers their eloquence and power, for their
audiences can readily perceive that citizenship is under-inclusive for DREAM-
ers, and many feel it is wrong to deny the full membership conveyed by citizen-
ship to people who are so fully integrated in America.7 DREAMers make a
2 The bill passed the House in 2010. Chris Richardson, DREAM Act Passed by House, but
Senate May Be Tougher, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 9, 2010, 8:03 AM), http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/1209/DREAM-Act-passed-by-House-but-Senate-
may-be-tougher.
3 The Act provides “conditional” permanent residence that has the possibility of becoming
permanent residence if the individuals complete a certain level of higher education or serve
in the military. H.R. 1842§ 5(a)(1). Permanent residence, as discussed infra Part II.B.2, is a
sine qua non of eligibility for citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
4 See, e.g., H.R. 1842 §§ 3(a)(1), 5(a)(1).
5 Id. at § 5(a)(1)(A). Good moral character is defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012). For a
full exploration of the ways in which criminal convictions affect eligibility for citizenship,
see Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87
IND. L.J. 1571 (2012). Lapp’s thoughtful article examines in depth a specific, powerful
aspect of the more general concern underlying this present article, namely the steady restric-
tion of who is deemed eligible, or worthy, of citizenship, and the failure to apply principles
of redemption to citizenship. Id. at 1571.
6 Julia Preston, Young Immigrants Say It’s Obama’s Time to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/us/dream-act-gives-young-immi
grants-a-political-voice.html?pagewanted=all; see also Olivares, supra note 1, at 379–80.
7
 President Obama’s remarks announcing his immigration reform proposal captured this
sense of wrongness, as he discussed the story of DREAMer Alan Aleman, who hopes to join
the Air Force after college. President Obama remarked, “[R]emember Alan and all those
who share the same hopes and the same dreams. Remember that this is not just a debate
about policy. It’s about people. It’s about men and women and young people who want
nothing more than the chance to earn their way into the American story.” Barack Obama,
U.S. President, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Jan. 29,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 4 21-JAN-14 17:19
104 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:101
compelling case for re-evaluating who is and is not a full member of American
society precisely because they lack culpability for their present immigration
situations (having been brought by parents, or to join family members at a
young age) and because they are today’s standard-bearers for the perennial
American dream. That they are able to recast the American dream with the
stories and faces of people of color provides an overdue contrast to the stun-
ningly race-exclusive history of citizenship.
This expansive recasting of history comes with a restrictive corollary,
however. The DREAM movement has shifted the history of citizenship away
from its troubled racial past, but in doing so inadvertently raises the bar for how
America perceives citizenship itself, by casting citizenship discourse in terms
of worthiness and blamelessness. When citizenship is assessed with an ever-
narrowing view of worthiness, many are left outside its frame. Immigrants who
might historically have been viewed as prospective citizens, or “Americans in
waiting” to use Hiroshi Motomura’s powerful conception,8 may be excluded as
America narrows prospective citizenship using a framework of worthiness.
This narrowing leaves out the laborer with strong community ties but who
never graduated high school, or the high school valedictorian who got two
drunk and disorderly convictions and one conviction for possessing marijuana.
The distinctions between the worthy DREAMers and the less worthy, or
unworthy, have manifested in the dramatically different approaches taken
toward the two groups in every currently contested proposal for comprehensive
immigration reform.
The discourse of worthiness and blamelessness inherent in the DREAM
movement exposes a discourse of undesirability and unworthiness that is
already vividly alive not just within immigration reform debates and citizenship
law, but also in such civil rights issues as felon disenfranchisement and voter
identification laws, both of which affect those who already have citizenship.
The debates around these aspects of voting rights, which are essential to the
exercise of citizenship, have included the same discourse of worthiness and
blamelessness. Situating the DREAM movement among these other concurrent
issues affecting the understanding and enjoyment of citizenship in America,
this article names the danger of a hopeful, inspiring movement becoming bound
up in a move to make full membership in American society—exemplified by
our understanding of citizenship—more exclusive. As ideas about citizenship
regress to a very restrictive mean, and citizenship becomes a good to be par-
celed out among the “worthy,” we trade a problem of under-inclusion for a
problematic flexibility in defining citizens out of our polity as well.9
This article first examines the dilemma, in Part I, by analyzing both the
legislative approaches to the DREAMers and the narrative and strategy
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/remarks-presi
dent-comprehensive-immigration-reform [hereinafter Obama Remarks Jan. 29, 2013].
8 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) [hereinafter AMERICANS IN WAITING].
9 The article in this way responds, at least in part, to the challenge laid out by Jennifer
Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and
Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2494 (2007) (discussing the lack of connec-
tion between immigration and critical race scholarship).
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required to advance the DREAMers’ goals. Part I introduces the idea of worthi-
ness and blamelessness advanced by DREAMers in their efforts to make their
cause more politically feasible. Part II looks at the positive ways in which the
DREAMers have vitally exposed the problem of under-inclusion in our current
citizenship laws, whereby America fails to extend full formal membership to
people who subjectively feel like citizens already. The DREAMers’ answer to
the problem calls for a definition of citizenship that puts forward a more hope-
ful, positive vision of membership in American society, and demonstrates a
radical expansion of the idea, if not the formalities, of U.S. citizenship. Part III
turns to the broader questions of race and worthiness that are found both in
immigration history and current immigration laws and processes, examining
how the three forms of citizenship-acquisition—citizenship by place of birth,
by parentage, and by naturalization—incorporate ideas of worthiness and raise
issues of race.
A discourse of worthiness, however, can imply and justify a discourse of
unworthiness; a discourse of blamelessness provides the opportunity to ques-
tion people’s culpability for not being full members. Part IV turns to this risk of
the narrowing of “citizenship-worthiness,” examining how the discourse of
worthiness connects with strands of political conversations around perceived
problems of over-inclusion of citizenship. This happens in two distinct arenas.
First, this article turns to the immigration context where worthiness-based dis-
course limits who is likely to benefit from immigration reform and supports
attacks on birthright citizenship. Second, this article considers problems beyond
the immigration context, including the disenfranchisement of felons, and
attempts to make voter registration more difficult. Each of these problems also
intersect with questions of race, bringing race-based exclusion back into citi-
zenship discourse. This article concludes by urging awareness of the compli-
cated ways that race and citizenship have always intersected, and how
worthiness-discourse can be subverted both to shift that history and to continue
it.
I. THE DREAM: LEGISLATION AND NARRATIVE
A. The DREAM Act and Immigration Reform Proposals for DREAMers
The various incarnations of the DREAM Act have emphasized the charac-
teristic strengths of the immigrant youth who are the face of the movement,
seeking passage of the law by structuring its requirements around education,
service, length of time in the United States, age of entry, and relative absence
of criminal convictions. Since it was first proposed in 2000, the DREAM Act
has laid out the same basic structure, providing both protection from deporta-
tion and a path to citizenship for certain immigrant youth.10 As will be
described more fully below, the criteria have included: entering before the age
of sixteen, having a high school diploma or GED, being admitted to higher
10 Michael A. Olivas, whose dedication to and scholarship on immigrants and education is
well known, has written a comprehensive overview of the legislation. Michael A. Olivas,
IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L.
435, 461–62 (2004).
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education institutions or non-profit trade schools, residing continuously in the
United States for five years, and possessing “good moral character,” largely
defined in immigration law by the absence of many kinds of criminal
convictions.11
After the Act last failed to pass in 2011, the Obama Administration
announced the temporary provision of work authorization for most of the youth
who would have been eligible for status under the Act.12 Because the Executive
Branch lacks the power to create new visa categories, the Administration acted
through the prism of enforcement and created “Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals,” or DACA.13 Deferred action generally is an administrative acknowl-
edgment that the individual in question will not be the subject of any immigra-
tion enforcement activities for a certain period of time. Deferred action, which
is essentially a form of prosecutorial discretion, has long been available through
the Department of Homeland Security for a wide variety of matters, although
data on its implementation are difficult to secure.14
DACA extended deferred action status for two years to youth who had
arrived in the United States before their sixteenth birthdays; had lived in the
United States for five years; were in school, had graduated from high school (or
received a general equivalency diploma, or GED), or been honorably dis-
charged from the armed services or Coast Guard; had been present in the
United States on June 15, 2012 (the date the policy was announced); and had
amassed no more than three misdemeanor convictions.15 The program attracted
immediate support from the DREAMers who celebrated its announcement.16
11 See, e.g., DREAM Act of 2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. §§ 3(a)(1), 5(a)(1) (2011);
“Good moral character” is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012), and is discussed more fully
infra Part I.B.2.
12 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15,
2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-presi
dent-immigration.
13 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred
Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred
-action-process-young-people-who-are-low.
14 Deferred action is defined through the regulation governing issuance of employment
authorization documents. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2013) (“An alien who has been granted
deferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives some
cases lower priority, if the alien establishes an economic necessity for employment.”); see
generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1 (2012); Michael A. Olivas,
DREAMS Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of
DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463 (2012).
15 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://1.usa.gov/LhQrYl (last updated Jan. 18, 2013).
16 See, e.g., Paul West, Latino Voters Show New Enthusiasm for Obama, BALT. SUN, June
19, 2012, at A8; Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to
Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?pagewanted=all (quoting
United We Dream Network leader Lorella Praeli, who said “People are just breaking down
and crying for joy when they find out what the president did.”).
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By August 2013, 588,725 individuals had submitted applications under the pro-
gram, 455,455 of which have been approved as of this writing.17
The outlines of both the DREAM Act and DACA reemerged in the 2013
Senate blueprint for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (“Senate Blueprint”)
and the Obama Administration’s proposed Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2013 (”Obama Proposal”).18 The Senate Blueprint created sepa-
rate systems for legalization: a slower, more restrictive one for non-DREAMer
immigrants, and a much faster one for the DREAMers and certain agricultural
workers.19 Notably, the non-DREAMers would be given a temporary “proba-
tionary status” until commissions from border states determined whether the
border had been adequately secured, at which point those with probationary
status could apply for lawful permanent residence.20 To achieve probationary
status in the first place, the plan called for those immigrants to pay “their debt
to society,” and a severe provision sending the immigrants to the proverbial
back of the immigration line.21 “Individuals who are present without lawful
status—not including people within the two categories identified below—will
only receive a green card [under this law] after every individual who is already
waiting in line for a green card, at the time this legislation is enacted, has
received their green card.”22 Notably, immigrants with criminal convictions are
ineligible for the status.23 By contrast, DREAMers are exempted from this gen-
eral process, although the Blueprint did not detail the process that would be
made available for them.24 This bifurcation continued throughout the policy
17 Data on Individual Applications and Petitions: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites
/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20
Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/daca-13-9-11.pdf. After a slow start, USCIS began
approving approximately 50,000 of the applications each month. Id.
18 See Julia Preston, Senators Offer a New Blueprint for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/politics/senators-agree-on
-blueprint-for-immigration.html?pagewanted=all.
19 See id. The exceptional treatment of agricultural workers itself hearkens back to an earlier
age of immigration politics, when the Immigration Act of 1924 imposed no quotas on migra-
tion from Mexico, due to the needs of farmers for agricultural labor. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSI-
BLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 50 (2004)
[hereinafter NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS] .
20 Press Release, U.S. Senators Schumer, McCain, Durbin, Graham, Menendez, Rubio,
Bennet, & Flake, Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Jan. 29,
2013), available at http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=87afa
1c7-c0ac-6131-5e8e-9bf8904159e6 [hereinafter Senate Blueprint].
21 Id. The State Department Visa Bulletin publishes the wait times for visas in different
categories. The June 2013 bulletin showed that the shortest wait (two years) was for spouses
and children of lawful permanent residents. Unmarried adult children of citizens were next,
with a wait of approximately seven years (but twenty years if those children were from
Mexico). Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens had a roughly eleven-year wait (or
twenty from Mexico and twenty-one from the Philippines). Longest were siblings of U.S.
citizens, who faced a twelve-year wait generally, or seventeen years from Mexico, and
twenty-four years from the Philippines. Visa Bulletin for June 2013, U.S. Dep’t of State,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5953.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
22 Senate Blueprint, supra note 20.
23 Id. 
24 Id.
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debates in the Senate, and exists in the bill approved by the Senate in June
2013.25
Those seeking this relief would need to pay a penalty, pay back taxes (if
any), learn English, and understand U.S. history prior to obtaining permanent
residence at the later date.26 Immigrants with certain criminal convictions
would not be able to apply (although, prospectively, the bill significantly soft-
ens existing immigration consequences of criminal convictions).27 The lengthy
wait, notably, would not apply to DREAMers—those deemed eligible for
DACA. These individuals could adjust to permanent residence on an expedited
track, after five years, if they went to college or serve in the Armed Forces.28
Notably, while comprehensive reform languished in the House of Repre-
sentatives, one of the first pieces of legislation to attract interest for a different
kind of reform was a version of the DREAM Act. Eager to do something on
immigration reform but hesitant to embrace the broad multi-faceted approach
taken by the Senate, the DREAM Act appeared to be the most accessible option
available to House Republicans. House Speaker John Boehner stated that this
step-by-step approach, one in which the DREAMers came first, was in lieu of
taking a comprehensive approach.29 House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and
the Chair of the Judiciary Committee, Bob Goodlatte, offered the bill noting
that “[t]hese children came here through no fault of their own and many of
them know no other home than the United States.”30
The momentum toward passage of the DREAM Act, the administrative
embrace of the principles of the Act through the implementation of DACA, and
the bipartisan support for a special track for DREAMers in comprehensive
immigration reform efforts all show how powerfully the DREAMers have
occupied much of the rhetorical space for the advance of immigration reform.
25 Ed O’Keefe, Senates Approves Immigration Bill, WASH. POST. NEWS SERVICE (June 27,
2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-27/politics/40222888_1_immigration
-bill-house-speaker-john-a-u-s-border-patrol; see also The Top 5 Things the Immigration
Reform Bill Accomplishes, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 27, 2013), www.american-
progress.org/issues/immigration/news/2013/06/27/68338/the-top-5-things-the-senate-immi
gration-reform-bill-accomlishes/ (noting among the accomplishments the “most generous
DREAM Act ever”).
26 O’Keefe, supra note 25.
27 Alan Gomez, White House Immigration Plan Offers Path to Residency, USA Today (Feb.
16, 2013, 10:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/16/Obama-immi
gration-bill/1925017/. For an assessment of the changes softening the impact of certain crim-
inal convictions, see Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a Herna´ndez, Obama Immigration Plan Is
Mixed Bag, CRIMMIGRATION BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/
2013/02/20/obama-immigration-plan-is-mixed-bag.aspx.
28 IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, SPECIAL REPORT: A GUIDE TO S.744: UNDERSTANDING
THE 2013 SENATE IMMIGRATION BILL 8 (July 2013), available at http://www.immigration
policy.org/special-reports/guide-s744-understanding-2013-senate-immigration-bill.
29 Russell Berman & Molly K. Hooper, House Republicans Crafting DREAM Act-like
Immigration Bill, HILL (July 11, 2013, 5:46 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/3105
91-house-gop-crafting-gop-version-of-dream-act.
30 Id.
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B. The Narrative Being Told
1. Harnessing the American Dream
The DREAM movement references the classic narrative of the American
dream. The classic American dream, a powerful piece of national mythology,
suggests that anyone can come to or be born in America and achieve greatness
through hope and tenacity. DREAMers call upon the vision of America as the
“land of opportunity,” where anyone with the commitment to work hard can
prosper. They remind us of the promise of the Statue of Liberty, and with it, our
visions of the boats filled with people seeking safety and prosperity in the
United States. And, of course, the name of the movement itself invokes the
American Dream:
[T]hat dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every
man, with opportunity for each according to his ability or achievement . . . a dream of
social order in which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest
stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they
are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position.31
The typical DREAMer narrative is one of success against great odds.32 In
this narrative, the DREAMer, despite having no legal status, has graduated
from an American high school and done something of great note: he or she has
finished school despite enormous health or family struggles, risen to leadership
positions, cared for ailing relatives, engaged in significant community activism
and community service, and so forth. The DREAMer is often also hoping to
channel all of his or her hopes and energy into becoming a lawyer, a doctor, a
journalist, a scientist, or any number of other professions requiring further edu-
cation and commitment. In the examples below, where DREAMers put forward
stories of struggle and obstacles overcome by dedication to hopes and dreams,
the DREAMers summon and share much with the classic, perennial invocations
of the American Dream.
Gaby Pacheco, a DREAM leader from Florida, has lived in the United
States since she was seven.33 As the above narrative suggests, she excelled in
school from an early age and took part in the ROTC program at her high
school, while also playing on numerous school sports teams.34 She made her
way to college where she became student government president for the entire
Florida state college system, and founded the organization Students Working
31 JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 404 (1931).
32 This composite identifies the shared characteristics of the kinds of stories told at Dream
Activist. See Our Stories, DREAM ACTIVIST: UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS ACTION AND
RESOURCE NETWORK, http://www.dreamactivist.org/about/our-stories/ [hereinafter DREAM
ACTIVIST] (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). Each story is unique, but it is possible to identify and
name the common strands. In this way, the DREAM movement shares something interesting
with the anti-slavery movement, which was also richly story-driven, and from which narra-
tive types could be identified. Scholars have discussed both the usefulness of stories to
advancing the cause of abolitionism, and the creation of a prototypical slave narrative,
despite the undeniable individuality of each particular story. See, e.g., James Olney, I Was
Born, in THE SLAVE’S NARRATIVE (Charles T. Davis & Henry Louis Gates eds., 1985).
33 Daniel Altschuler, DREAMing of Citizenship: An Interview with Gaby Pacheco, AMS. Q.
(Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2040/.
34 Id.
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for Equal Rights, among others.35 She walked with other DREAMers all the
way from Florida to Washington, D.C. to publicize the need for passage of the
DREAM Act.36
Likewise, Yves Gomes came to the U.S. with his parents when he was
only fourteen months old, excelled at school, became involved at his local
Catholic church, and cared for (and still cares for) his cousin suffering from
muscular dystrophy.37 He has been active in promoting both federal DREAM
legislation and a state DREAM Act in Maryland to provide undocumented
Maryland high school graduates with access to in-state tuition.38
Soporuchi Victor Chukwueke—a Nigerian orphan, abandoned because of
a serious medical condition—came to the United States at age fifteen for a
series of surgeries to address that medical condition.39 He entered on a visitor
visa, but once it expired he lacked lawful immigration status.40 Despite the
strains and difficulties of the multiple medical procedures he underwent in
Michigan, he completed a GED and graduated from Wayne State University,
dreaming of further education in medical school.41 Chukwueke’s situation and
his medical dreams caught the attention of Senator Carl Levin, who sponsored
a private bill to provide Chukwueke with lawful permanent residence.42 An
extraordinarily rare immigration remedy,43 the private bill for Chukwueke
passed the Senate on December 18, 201244 and was signed into law by Presi-
dent Obama on December 28, 2012.45
Perhaps most famously, Jose Antonio Vargas, a Pulitzer-prize winning
journalist from the Philippines, came out as undocumented in a New York
35 Id.
36 A Long Walk for a Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at A21, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/us/politics/29students.html.
37 Yves Gomes: Maryland 17 Year Old to Be Deported, KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER, http:/
/www.keepingfamiliestogether.net/yves-gomes-maryland-17-year-old-to-be-deported/ (last
visited Nov. 13, 2013) (website contains a video depicting Mr. Gomes’ situation); Andrea
McCarren, Yves Gomes Is Set to Leave the Country August 13th, WUSA9 (July 16, 2010,
11:55 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=104323; Yves Gomes:
Photo Story, WE ARE AM., http://weareamericastories.org/photos/yves-photo-story/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2013).
38
“A Step in the Right Direction”: Maryland Student Reflects on DREAM Act, PBS NEWS
HOUR (June 15, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/speakout/us/jan-june12/yves_06
-15.html.
39 Faith Karimi, Obama Signs Bill to Grant Nigerian Student U.S. Permanent Residency,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/29/world/africa/us-nigerian-obama-law/index.html (last
updated Dec. 29, 2012, 7:38 AM).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Shankar Vedantam, ‘Angels Behind Me’, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2010, at B1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/16/AR2010111606640
.html (“Even as anti-immigrant sentiment has swelled in large swaths of the country, many
communities are willing to do battle for individual immigrants who have become part of
their lives. Each year, their lobbying efforts produce scores of private bills in Congress
seeking to grant individual immigrants legal residency. Few are passed.”).
44 Benach Ragland LLP, One-Man DREAM Act Passes Congress, BENACH RAGLAND BLOG
(Dec. 19, 2012), www.benachragland.com/benach-ragland-blog/one-man-dream-act-passes
-congress.
45 Karimi, supra note 39.
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Times magazine cover story in June 2011.46 Vargas had entered the United
States on what he learned later was a fraudulently obtained visa and passport.47
His New York Times essay details the ways in which he had to hide his undocu-
mented status, all the while amassing ever-greater career laureates, culminating
with the Pulitzer Prize in 2008.48 Vargas describes the profound disconnect
between his struggle to keep his lack of status a secret and his feelings of being
an American, writing:
At the risk of deportation—the Obama administration has deported almost 800,000
people in the last two years—[DREAMers] are speaking out. Their courage has
inspired me. There are believed to be 11 million undocumented immigrants in the
United States. We’re not always who you think we are. Some pick your strawberries
or care for your children. Some are in high school or college. And some, it turns out,
write news articles you might read. I grew up here. This is my home. Yet even though
I think of myself as an American and consider America my country, my country
doesn’t think of me as one of its own.49
The organization Vargas has founded to advance the DREAMer cause is
therefore appropriately named “Defining American.” The photo gracing the
cover of Time Magazine reflects how much diversity is a part of that redefini-
tion: Vargas at the center of a large cluster of youth from all corners of the
world.50 And where early accounts of the American dream prominently fea-
tured a dreamer who was white, and usually male, this photo showed that the
quintessential DREAMer today, male or female, is an immigrant of color.
Vargas proved the strength of the movement’s narrative on June 19, 2012,
when he did a television interview with Bill O’Reilly,51 whose views on immi-
gration had been strongly restrictionist.52 Indeed, O’Reilly uses the word “ille-
gal” twice in the first twenty seconds of the interview alone.53 Nonetheless,
O’Reilly characterizes the DREAMers as “helping the nation,” and after listen-
ing to Vargas’ story calls it “compelling” and agrees that “there should be a
process for [Vargas]” and others “dragged across the border.”54 O’Reilly
sharply distinguishes Vargas, however, from the older immigrant who crosses
the border illegally, for whom there should be no process.55 The interview thus
captured one implicit piece of the DREAMer narrative: blamelessness.
46 Jose Antonio Vargas, Outlaw, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 26, 2011, at MM22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/magazine/my-life-as-an-undocumented-immigrant
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [hereinafter Vargas, Outlaw].
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. (emphasis added).
50 Jose Antonio Vargas, We Are Americans (Just Not Legally), TIME, June 25, 2012, availa-
ble at http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120625,00.html [hereinafter Vargas, We
Are Americans].
51 Interview by Bill O’Reilly with Jose Antonio Vargas, The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News
television broadcast June 19, 2012), available at http://video.foxnews.com/v/1697317877
001/jose-antonio-vargas-talks-to-bill-oreilly/.
52 See, e.g., Frances Martel, Bill O’Reilly: ‘There Is an Invasion from Mexico into the
United States’, MEDIAITE (Apr. 7, 2010, 8:04 AM), http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bill-oreilly
-there-is-an-invasion-from-mexico-into-the-united-states/.
53 Interview by Bill O’Reilly with Jose Antonio Vargas, supra note 51.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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2. A Story of Worthiness and Blamelessness
The moral clarity and strength of the DREAMers’ call comes from this
summoning of the American dream, which has emphasized the worthiness of
the DREAMers to be the inheritors and advancers of the dream today. Blame-
lessness, as highlighted in the Vargas/O’Reilly interview above, is deeply con-
nected with the idea of worthiness. Worthiness itself, as applied to DREAMers,
manifests as a commitment to education, patriotism, virtue,56 industriousness,
and community ties. This article will discuss these components before moving
on to a discussion of blamelessness.
First, consider the commitment to education that is so prominent in the
DREAMer narrative. To qualify for conditional permanent residence (a tempo-
rary “green card”) under the DREAM Act, the individual must have enrolled in
an “institute of higher education in the United States” or completed high school
or its equivalent.57 One route to having conditions lifted and transitioning to
full “permanent residence” is to either obtain a higher-education degree or
complete at least two years in a bachelor’s or other higher education program.58
This commitment to education—encompassing struggles to remain in school
and to find ways to access higher education—unites the stories of Pacheco,
Gomes, Chukwueke, and Vargas above. Likewise, at rallies for the DREAM
act, the DREAMers often appear wearing high school caps and gowns, making
their commitment to education the central visual metaphor for their cause.59
The second criterion is patriotism: another route to full permanent resi-
dence is serving in the military for at least two years, without being dishonora-
bly discharged.60 Pacheco’s  ROTC service speaks to this quality of patriotism,
as does the fact that many DREAMers who wanted to join the military appear
at rallies wearing combat fatigues.61 Indeed, the DREAM movement relies on
56 Virtuousness encompasses both avoidance of criminal trouble, and affirmative compli-
ance with tax obligations. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Readers Have Questions, Too, on a Com-
plex Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/04/23/us/politics/q-and-a-the-senate-immigration-bill.html?pagewanted=all. This
emphasis on tax-paying resonates with an incident from 1740 whereby the black population
of South Carolina sought repeal of the Negro Act arguing that, as taxpayers, they should not
be subjected to the law’s indignities. Andre Smith, Remarks at the 2013 Mid-Atlantic People
of Color Conference: A Tax History of Race in the United States (Jan. 25, 2013).
57 DREAM Act of 2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(D) (2011).
58 Id. § 5(a)(1)(D)(i).
59 See, e.g., Elise Foley, DREAM Act, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Derail Defense Bill
amid Republican Filibuster, FLA. INDEP. (Sept. 21, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://floridaindepen
dent.com/8491/dream-act-don%E2%80%99t-ask-don%E2%80%99t-tell-repeal-derail
-defense-bill-amid-republican-filibuster (photo accompanying story); Rachel Roubein, An
Educational Battle: Both Sides of DREAM Act Use Grassroots Activism, CARROLL COUNTY
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.carrollcountytimes.com/news/local/an-educa
tional-battle-both-sides-of-dream-act-usegrassrootsusegrassroots/article_d02323bd-cf89-5e
fc-ad05-6904256ccb48.html?mode=story (photo accompanying story).
60 H.R. 1842 § 5(a)(1)(D)(ii).
61 Daniel Altschuler, The Dreamers’ Movement Comes of Age, DISSENT MAG. (May 16,
2011), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-dreamers-movement-comes-of
-age:
At the same time, immigrant youth activism got the country’s attention. Dreamers developed a
compelling iconography to highlight their stories. Graduation caps and gowns became ubiquitous
at DREAM events, where students not only protested but also donated blood, prayed alongside
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explicit statements that this is the country these DREAMers already love. As
one DREAMer testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommit-
tee on Immigration, “I grew up here. I am American in my heart. There are
thousands of DREAMers just like me. All we are asking for is a chance to
contribute.”62 Senator Durbin, perennial sponsor of the bill, added, “[t]hey are
willing to serve the country they love. All they’re asking for is a chance.”63
President Obama likewise highlighted the patriotic aspects of the DREAMer
story in his plan for immigration reform, commenting on how one DREAMer
had “pledged allegiance to the flag” and wanted to serve in the Air Force.64
The third criterion is virtue, broadly defined: the individual must possess
good moral character,65 a term of art in immigration law66 that means the indi-
vidual, among other things, has no “aggravated felonies.”67 “Aggravated fel-
ony” is yet another term of art encompassing a range of crimes from the
inarguably grave—such as murder and rape—to other, arguably less “aggra-
vated” crimes, like receipt of stolen property (with a possible sentence of one
year or more) or selling marijuana.68 The most prominent DREAM narratives
are silent about criminal offenses, and even without passage of DREAM legis-
lation, criminal offenses are considered negative factors in accessing any lesser
immigration relief, such as deferred action and prosecutorial discretion.69
religious leaders, and in one case held a ‘study-in’ in a Senate cafeteria. Those Dreamers who
wish to serve in the armed forces also played their part, dressing in fatigues and donning flags
while they marched and saluted their way through the Capitol. These actions reinforced a persua-
sive narrative of young people who simply want to study and serve.
62 James Parks, DREAM Act Students Want a Chance to Serve the Country They Love,
AFL-CIO NOW (June 28, 2011), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation
/DREAM-Act-Students-Want-A-Chance-to-Serve-the-Country-They-Love.
63 Id.
64 Obama Remarks Jan. 29, 2013, supra note 7.
65 H.R. 1842 § 5(a)(1)(A).
66 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012) (defining good moral character).
67 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining aggravated felony).
68 Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185 (2007) (“Immigration law provides for
removal from the United States of an alien convicted of ‘a theft offense (including receipt of
stolen property) . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.’ ”); Mon-
crieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683–86 (2013) (sale of marijuana is an aggravated
felony). Kevin Lapp has thoughtfully examined how the “good moral character” requirement
that is woven through various junctures in the immigration process creates a high bar for
those seeking fuller membership in U.S. society. Lapp, supra note 5, at 1571. “Using crimi-
nal records as a proxy for virtue and a character test as a precondition for access to the
franchise does not promote or protect democracy. This is especially so when the blunt instru-
ment of immigration law’s ‘aggravated felony’ provision does the decisive work.” Id. at
1623–24; see also Jennifer Chaco´n, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restric-
tions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1831 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Chaco´n, Unsecured Borders] (assessing the steady encroachment of criminal law into the
field of immigration, and how both have been “subsumed” into the issue of national
security).
69 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to
All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, & All Chief Counsel, on Exercis-
ing Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo
.pdf.
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Finally, community ties matter to eligibility for the DREAM Act in two
ways. First, the DREAM Act uses length of U.S. residence as a proxy for suffi-
cient ties to the country. The bill explicitly requires that the individual have
lived in the United States for not less than five years before the enactment of
the law, and have arrived before the age of sixteen.70 Second, and less explic-
itly, the central focus on education aligns with the idea that the American edu-
cational system serves a principal role in integrating our nation’s youth and
promulgating the American identity, something recognized by the Supreme
Court itself in Plyler v. Doe.71
Moreover, the discretionary nature of the applications for permanent resi-
dence for DREAMers offers an opportunity to include other evidence of com-
munity ties, patriotism, and character, and conversely raises the possibility that
even those who meet the eligibility criteria could be denied if something about
their situations felt unworthy to the adjudicator.72 Here, a DREAMer will show
not just that he or she graduated high school, but that he or she received an
award for contributions to yearbook or took several advanced placement clas-
ses. The DREAMer might speak about patriotism and his or her desire to give
back to America through service, or a dream to go into law enforcement. The
DREAMer will show not simply that he or she has lived in the United States
for five years, but that the time had meaning as measured by the ways in which
family, friends, and community leaders speak about his or her volunteer work,
leadership and activism, and family ties.
The DREAMers’ powerful narrative is not based solely on their worthi-
ness; indeed, what makes them especially worthy of citizenship status is the
fact that they are blameless for their situation.73 At first, the narrative itself
emphasized that the DREAMers, brought here as youth, did not choose to break
the immigration laws, so they should not be punished.74 Although the
DREAMers have more recently been de-emphasizing this distinction between
those brought here without a choice and those who brought them, the distinc-
tion was embraced in the early moves toward immigration reform in January
70 H.R. 1842 § 3(a)(1)(A).
71 Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs? Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Ameri-
cans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 373 (2012) [hereinafter Motomura, Who
Belongs?] (discussing how Plyler advanced the integration of immigrants by “emphasizing
the importance of education for children who lacked lawful immigration status”).
72 I more fully discussed the consequences of such exercises of discretion in Elizabeth
Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S.
Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012).
73 The costs of this are discussed infra Part III.
74 See, e.g., Let Policy Stand As Is, LEAVENWORTH TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, at A4 (“Immigrant
children brought here by their parents are not guilty of the sins of their mothers and
fathers.”); Kevin Cirilli, Eric Cantor Markets the GOP to Busy Families, POLITICO (Feb. 5,
2013, 2:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/cantor-pitches-gop-to-busy-families
-87209.html (quoting Eric Cantor: “One of the great founding principles of our country was
that children would not be punished for the mistakes of their parents.”); James Q. Lynch,
DOT to Begin Issuing Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented Residents, GAZETTE (Iowa) (Jan.
23, 2013, 7:14 PM), http://thegazette.com/2013/01/23/dot-to-begin-issuing-drivers-licenses-
to-undocumented-residents/ (quoting Rep. Steve King: “Some were brought here by their
parents without having any say about it or any knowledge. That’s true and we have sympa-
thy for them.”).
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2013. The idea of blamelessness is reflected dramatically in the Senate immi-
gration reform blueprint, which states, “individuals who entered the United
States as minor children did not knowingly choose to violate any immigration
laws. Consequently, under our proposal these individuals will not face the same
requirements as other individuals in order to earn a path to citizenship.”75 Like-
wise, the President’s call for comprehensive immigration reform, one day after
eight Senators introduced the Senate Blueprint, emphasized that those being
legalized needed to pay a fine and then go “to the back of the line, behind all
the folks who are trying to come here legally. That’s only fair, right?”76
Although the DREAMer strategy changed consciously and explicitly in
December 2012, the narrative’s compelling tale of blamelessness still resonates
in these initial proposals for comprehensive immigration reform.
II. DREAMERS EXPOSING AND EXPANDING THE LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP
A. The Claiming of Citizenship During a Time of Illegality-Discourse
DREAMer self-identification as “Americans already” reveals a gap
between the identity of citizenship and the formal status of citizenship. This
gap is particularly pronounced at a time when the political discourse centers so
heavily on status and the concept of “illegality.” Moreover, and troubling for
the DREAMers’ goals, emphasis on legal status has increased as paths to secur-
ing legal status have steadily narrowed. In this section, the article examines
how the narrative embraced by the DREAM movement moves in tension with
these concerns about legal status, and explores how the DREAMers have, in
some ways adapted to the prevalent discourse of illegality, but also highlighted
a different framework for thinking about citizenship beyond “status.”
1. A Clash Between Citizenship as Identity and Citizenship as Status
DREAMers frequently and unequivocally self-identify as American. “We
Are Americans” was the title of the influential Time Magazine cover story
essay in 2012 by Vargas.77 Yves Gomes reiterated this idea when he told the
Washington Post, “I consider myself an American.”78 Others talk unselfcon-
sciously about being “good citizens,” without implying that they have that for-
mal status.79 President Obama invoked this “already American” theme as he
75 Senate Blueprint, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
76 Obama Remarks Jan. 29, 2013, supra note 7. For a critique of the “line” referenced in
these remarks, see Mae M. Ngai, Reforming Immigration for Good, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2013, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/opinion/reforming-immigra
tion-for-good.html [hereinafter Ngai, Reforming Immigration] (“In practice, [the per country
quote system] means it is easy to immigrate here from, say, Belgium or New Zealand, but
there are long waits—sometimes decades—for applicants from China, India, Mexico and the
Philippines. These four max out on the limit every year.”).
77 Vargas, We Are Americans, supra note 50.
78 David Montgomery, Illegal Indian Immigrant is Granted Rare Reprieve, Allowed to Stay
in U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2010, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/11/AR2010081106293.html.
79 The “good citizen” phrase is suggestive of another form of citizenship discourse. LUIS
F.B. PLASCENCIA, DISENCHANTING CITIZENSHIP: MEXICAN MIGRANTS AND THE BOUNDARIES
OF BELONGING 14 (2012).
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announced the deferred action policy for DREAMers: “They are Americans in
their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on paper.”80 This citi-
zenship of the heart and mind taps into the notion of being a “good citizen” that
exists outside the immigration context, which is seldom invoked with reference
to formal legal status,81 but rather to being involved in one’s community,
actively volunteering, caring for elderly neighbors, participating in school
activities, and so forth. In this way, citizenship is a metaphor for a set of desira-
ble characteristics, characteristics that the DREAMers collectively embody.82
This self-identification as “American already” fits squarely within the the-
ory of citizenship as identity. Linda Bosniak has described this as “citizenship’s
psychological dimension, that part of citizenship that describes the affective
ties of identification and solidarity that we maintain with groups of other people
in the world.”83 Bosniak captures the essence of the DREAMers’ claims to
belonging in America: “The term citizenship here is deployed to evoke the
quality of belonging—the felt aspects of community membership.”84 As
DREAMer after DREAMer states, being American is about opportunity and
contribution to the community, and their stories emphasize those contributions
and indicia of community membership, demonstrating that their attributes mir-
ror those of the “good citizen” in its popular, metaphorical sense.85 For
DREAMers like Vargas and others, full citizenship would be an “outward man-
ifestation of inward truth.”86
This existing “inward truth” clashes, however, with another theory of citi-
zenship: citizenship as formal legal status. Citing political philosopher Joseph
Carens, Bosniak describes this conception of citizenship as “a matter of legal
recognition.”87 This approach to defining citizenship is simplest because it is
demarcated by clear lines: one is either born an American citizen by parent-
age88 or location of birth, or becomes one after naturalizing according to the
parameters set by the Immigration and Nationality Act. This simply requires
80 Preston & Cushman, supra note 16. As Mae Ngai described of an earlier period, these
people, fully present here with no concomitant legal status, are a “class of persons within the
national body—illegal aliens—whose inclusion in the nation was at once a social reality and
a legal impossibility.” Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration
Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1924-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV.
69, 71 (2003) [hereinafter Ngai, Strange Career].
81 If it were so invoked, it would have serious immigration consequences. INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2012)) (permanently barring the
admission of someone who falsely claimed U.S. citizenship).
82 See DREAM ACTIVIST, supra note 32.
83 Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 479
(2000).
84 Id.
85 See Seyla Benhabib, The Morality of Migration, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2012, 5:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/stone-immigration/.
86 Naima Ramos-Chapman, ‘American,’ But Just Undocumented, GENERATION PROGRESS
(June 15, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://genprogress.org/voices/2012/06/15/17939/american-but
-just-undocumented/.
87 Bosniak, supra note 83, at 456 (citing Joseph H. Carens, Dimensions of Citizenship and
National Identity In Canada, 28 PHIL. F. 111–12 (1996–97)).
88 Professor Isabel Medina is exploring the borderline cases where citizenship through par-
entage is actually highly contested and difficult to prove, raising interesting issues of race,
gender, sexual orientation, and class. M. Isabel Medina, Derivative Citizenship: What’s Mar-
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application of the statute (or historical statutes, if trying to derive citizenship
through parents and grandparents)89 to the facts at hand, and the answer to the
inquiry is either yes or no—there are no shades of meaning or degrees of citi-
zenship under this conception. One either is or is not a citizen, and therefore the
DREAMers’ lack of formal status is the only thing that matters, not their ties,
“American-ness,” or self-definition.
2. The Discourse of Illegality
This clash between immigration as identity and immigration as status mat-
ters profoundly at a time when the question of status dominates America’s
immigration debates. The preoccupation with “illegal immigrants” and “law-
breakers” makes primary the immigration status of immigrants, over and above
questions of economic need or contribution, poverty, family unification, and so
forth. Although the term is not a legally accurate one,90 and it fails to capture
the fluidity with which people can sometimes move back and forth between
legal, illegal, and legal again,91 it is nonetheless politically powerful—and this
political salience contrasts starkly with the DREAMers self-identification as
Americans. The focus on illegality in contemporary political discourse differs
from many other points in America’s immigration history. Although this shift-
ing history has been well presented elsewhere, the article briefly traces how and
when concern with illegality became important, from the largely open borders
of the 19th century when it was all but impossible to immigrate illegally, to the
relentless focus on illegality that has characterized the debates on immigration
in the 21st century. By examining how the discourse of illegality has grown,
this section lays a foundation to understand why and how the DREAMers
needed a different way to justify their self-definition as American.
Much of America’s identity as a nation of immigrants derives, rightly or
wrongly, from the visual image of the Statue of Liberty paired with the words
of 19th century poet Emma Lazarus, engraved at the Statue’s base, inviting the
riage, Citizenship, Sex, Sexual Orientation, Race, and Class Got to Do With It? (Mar. 8,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
89 A vivid illustration of this process is the exercise in Legomsky and Rodriguez’s Immigra-
tion and Refugee Law and Policy casebook, which contrasts with almost every other exercise
in the case book that has levels of ambiguity to it. Students, reaching this problem at the end
of a semester of immigration law, are often relieved to know that they can input the informa-
tion into a chart and achieve a result. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODR´IGUEZ,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1294–95 (5th ed. 2009) (referencing a table
by Robert A. Mautino, Acquisition of Citizenship, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS 5, 8, 12–13
(1990)).
90 Charles Garcia, Why ‘Illegal Immigrant’ is a Slur, CNN (July 6, 2012, 12:14 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/opinion/garcia-illegal-immigrants/index.html.
91 Michael A. Olivas & Kristi L. Bowman, Plyler’s Legacy: Immigration and Higher Edu-
cation in the 21st Century, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 261, 263 (2011) (“But there had histori-
cally been such [legalization] provisions, through various means, and immigration status
was, at the least, not immutable.”). Mae M. Ngai also describes this fluidity, suggesting that
“shifts in the boundary between legal and illegal status might tell us a lot about how the
nation has imagined and constructed itself over time.” NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra
note 19, at 6; see also Prerna Lal, It’s More Complicated Than “Legal vs. Illegal”: An Open
Letter to Ruben Navarrette, NEW AM. MEDIA (July 10, 2012), http://newamericamedia.org
/2012/07/its-more-complicated-than-legal-vs-illegal.php.
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“tired” and “poor” to come.92 At that time it would have been almost impossi-
ble for the immigrants Lazarus would have known in New York City to be
“illegal immigrants” as we conceive of the term today. Indeed, in that “land of
opportunity” that awaited most non-Asian immigrants in the late 19th and early
20th century,93 there were simply immigrants who came alone or with families;
for economic opportunity, political refuge, or simple adventure, and who set-
tled across the country. Visa categories did not exist and so, although people
could be turned away for a few limited reasons (being a “convict,” having a
severe mental illness, or being likely to become a public charge),94 there was
no concept of “illegal immigrant” analogous to what exists today. Notably, the
iconic photos of Russian and Italian immigrants on boats in the shadow of the
Statue of Liberty come from that largely pre-regulated time, as do the immigra-
tion histories of many of the people who point out that their forebears came
legally. Legal immigration meant something entirely different at a time where it
was all but impossible to immigrate illegally.
As elements of public opinion began to perceive immigrants as threats to
both national security and public safety, Congress began passing laws that
barred categories of people from entering, thus creating a distinction between
legal immigration—those still permitted under those laws—and illegal immi-
gration—those who came in defiance of those laws. The creation of “illegal
immigration” occurred as nationalities were either barred outright or sharply
limited in their immigration by quotas in the 1920s.95 Would-be immigrants
from China were barred from entry beginning in 1882,96 and those from the
rest of Asia were barred by 1917 with the creation of the Asiatic Barred
Zone.97 While not barring immigration from other non-white areas entirely, the
Immigration Act of 1924 imposed quotas by country that were crafted to reflect
the U.S. population from 1890 before large waves of immigrants began arriving
from southern and eastern Europe or colonial-era Africa.98 This resulted in Ire-
land, the United Kingdom, and Germany securing approximately 113,000 slots,
and Northern Europe in general accounting for roughly 147,000 of the 164,456
92 Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, POETS.ORG, http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php
/prmMID/16111 (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). Lazarus wrote the poem to help raise funds for
the Statue of Liberty, and the poem was engraved on a plaque installed at the base of the
Statue of Liberty in 1903. Statue of Liberty: History and Culture, People, Emma Lazarus,
NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/stli/historyculture/emma-lazarus.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2013).
93 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 9, 13, 15, 17 (7th ed. 2012).
94 The Immigration Act of 1882 prohibited the immigration of “convict[s], lunatic[s],
idiot[s], or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public
charge.” Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214.
95 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 93, at 15.
96 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 2, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (commonly referred to as the Chinese
Exclusion Act).
97 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876, repealed by Immigration and National-
ity Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952).
98 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159. This act barred those who
were ineligible to naturalize, defined in 1790 as “free whites” and amended to include people
of African descent in 1870. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256.
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slots worldwide.99 Although Mexicans were not numerically restricted from
entering by the 1924 law, Mexicans began to enter illegally to avoid new barri-
ers to entry like head taxes and literacy tests.100 At the same time, as historian
Mae Ngai has described, acts of exclusion shifted from places visible to Ameri-
cans—ports and land crossings—to consulates overseas, and the would-be
immigrant became “thus something of a specter, a body stripped of individual
personage, whose very presence is troubling, wrong.”101
The immigration laws of the early 20th century also barred entry of people
because of certain characteristics they possessed beyond national origin: being
prostitutes, having a criminal record, being mentally ill, or being a habitual
drunkard, among others, all of which reflected concerns for public safety.102
Public safety concerns also intersected with the national origin limitations dis-
cussed above. The exclusion of the Chinese likewise emerged from a perceived
sense of threat to national wellbeing; in Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., the case test-
ing constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Court supported the
political branches’ assessment that the Chinese might “overrun” the United
States, and invoked national security as a justification for limiting constitu-
tional scrutiny of the law.103 The legislative history concerning the passage of
subsequent laws in 1917 and 1924 also invoked themes of criminality and
national security threats comparable to those we see today, seeing unauthorized
immigrants as “‘at best[,] a law violator from the outset.’ ”104
Interestingly, perhaps because they occurred during times with less eco-
nomic and geopolitical upheaval, the major immigration reforms of 1965 and
1986 never fully picked up these strands of illegality, criminality, and threats to
national security. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 conceptualized
the immigration system around the twin pillars of family and the economy, and
its passage occurred without widespread reference to “illegal immigrants.”105
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act was a compromise establishing
an employment authorization framework in exchange for amnesty for those
without legal status, and it was debated as a way to continue to welcome immi-
grants, albeit in a more controlled fashion. Senator Simpson, who introduced
the legislation, made a careful effort to remember that whatever problems were
99 Data derived from quotas announced by President Coolidge. Calvin Coolidge, U.S. Presi-
dent, Proclamation on the Comprehensive Immigration Law of 1924, CIVICS-ONLINE, http://
www.civics-online.org/library/formatted/texts/immigration1924.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2013).
100 NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 19, at 64.
101 Ngai, Strange Career, supra note 80, at 77.
102 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214.
103 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595, 609 (1889).
104 NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 19, at 62.
105 A search of the New York Times archives shows that in 1965, the term “illegal immi-
grant’ was used only three times, and never in conjunction with immigration reform. By
contrast, the term was found 539 times in 2006 and 705 times in 2007. See also Jennifer
Ludden, 1965 Immigration Law Changed the Face of America, NPR (May 9, 2006, 3:35
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5391395 (“It marked a radical
break with previous policy and has led to profound demographic changes in America. But
that’s not how the law was seen when it was passed—at the height of the civil rights move-
ment, at a time when ideals of freedom, democracy and equality had seized the
nation.”(emphasis added)).
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created by illegal immigration, there were “human beings” involved.106 The
Senator ended his pitch for the legislation by stating that the reform was neces-
sary lest there be “an increasing public intolerance—a lack of compassion if
you will—to all forms of immigration—legal and illegal. It is this unwanted
and wretched result that this bill today attempts to avoid.”107 Likewise, Repre-
sentative Rodino, who introduced the legislation in the House noted that “[i]t’s
a mistake to let this Problem go unaddressed. . . . What’s going to happen if we
don’t act is that a psychology will develop that says, ‘Don’t let anybody
in.’ ”108 Both politicians saw the bill as a means to prevent illegal immigration
from resulting in xenophobic attitudes.109
By contrast, today, status is the only concern for restrictionists—who are
both vocal and extreme—mirroring the ideas and rhetoric prevalent in the
1880s and 1920s. For such voices, from the incendiary Peter Brimelow110 to
the more diplomatic, but no less restrictionist, Mark Krikorian,111 the failure to
comply fully and permanently with immigration laws in the past is the sine qua
non of determining a person’s unworthiness for any immigration benefits in the
future. In other words, a violation of immigration laws becomes the mortal sin
and no redemption is possible.112 This view likewise informs the overall
criminalization of immigration violations,113 and shows up in such mainstream
policies as the “smart enforcement” initiative of the Obama administration,
which seeks to deport only the highest priority individuals, defined as criminals
and those who recently or repeatedly entered the country without inspection.114
That immigration violations are so routinely perceived as criminal by the pub-
106 131 CONG. REC. 13,585–86 (daily ed. May 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Simpson).
107 Id. at 13,586–87.
108 Peter Rodino Rides to the Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1985, § 4, at 20, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/21/opinion/peter-rodino-rides-to-the-rescue.html.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMI-
GRATION DISASTER xxi (1996).
111 See e.g., MARK KRIKORIAN, THE NEW CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION: BOTH LEGAL AND
ILLEGAL 2 (2008).
112 Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to
Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 100–01 (2008) “While the November 2006 elec-
tions appeared . . . to ameliorate some of these resentments, there is obviously a substantial
interest in the larger community and a simmering anger towards immigrants, especially those
who are undocumented or who are perceived to be undocumented. These resentments flare
up without warning or provocation.” Id. at 105.
113 Criminal convictions for immigration violations (particularly violations of 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1325–1326) rose 162.3% over the five-year period from 2007 through 2012 according to
a research project examining government data. Immigration Convictions for October 2012,
TRAC IMMIGR. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthly-
oct12/gui/.
114 Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y Homeland Sec., Remarks on Smart Effective Border Secur-
ity and Immigration Enforcement (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news
/2011/10/05/secretary-napolitanos-remarks-smart-effective-border-security-and-immigration
(“What those critics will ignore is that while the overall number of individuals removed will
exceed prior years, the composition of that number will have fundamentally changed. It will
consist of more convicted criminals, recent border crossers, egregious immigration law vio-
lators, and immigration fugitives than ever before.”).
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lic, the media, restrictionist leaders, and politicians, reveals much about the
way in which immigration status is fundamental.
Showing that discourse effects law-making, we can see that as the lan-
guage of “illegal immigrants” and “immigrant lawbreakers” has dominated the
political conversation, complementary legislation has steadily narrowed the cri-
teria for who is worthy of entering or remaining in the United States. As Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter has written of Supreme Court jurisprudence on
immigration:
[I]f immigrants are viewed as illegal alien criminals, then they should be captured
and deported. If immigration is an invasion from the south, then the government
should construct a virtual fence across the border to resist the Mexican offensive.
These ‘common sense’ responses are made possible by selective metaphoric
framing.”115
The emphasis on illegal immigration has had a similar effect in Congress
and the Executive branch. Where deportation had previously been reserved for
a number of especially serious crimes, the 1996 laws extended the possibility of
deportation to increasingly trivial convictions, and likewise added many more
categories of screening for intending visitors and immigrants.116 Laws follow-
ing the 2001 terrorist attacks placed heightened emphasis on screening for
security concerns at both the point of entry and when initiating deportation or
removal proceedings.117 Spending on border security and interior enforcement
is at record levels and exceeds all other federal law enforcement spending com-
bined.118 Meanwhile, such historically non-controversial laws as the Violence
115 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors and the Juris-
prudence of Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545, 1550 (2011).
116 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) added mul-
tiple crimes to the definition of aggravated felonies, either by enumerating new offenses, or
lowering the sentence required to make a conviction an aggravated felony (for example,
where previously $100,000 in damage had been required, IIRIRA lowered the threshold to
$10,000; where the minimum possible sentence for finding an aggravated felony had been
five years, IIRIRA expanded the category to include crimes where the possible sentence was
one year or more). Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104–208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996).
117 For a history of security concerns embedded in immigration law, see Chaco´n, Unsecured
Borders, supra note 68. Terrorism specifically has been a grounds for denying admission or
seeking removal since the Immigration Act of 1990, but the post-9/11 changes extended the
reach of the provisions, particularly with respect to the material support for terrorism provi-
sion, which precludes the admission and permits deportation of anyone who, in even trivial
ways, supported the work of an entity named a “terrorist organization.” INA
§§ 212(a)(3)(B), 237(a)(4)(B) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B), 1227(a)(4)(B) (2012),
respectively). The Patriot Act created an exception for those who “did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the act would further the organization’s terrorist activity.”
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272, 347 (2001),
amended by REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103(a), 119 Stat. 302, 307 (2005).
The REAL ID Act, however, narrowed this exception significantly by requiring someone to
prove that they did not know, nor reasonably should have known, by clear and convincing
evidence. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103(a), 119 Stat. 302, 307 (2005)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)).
118 Julia Preston, Huge Amounts Spent on Immigration, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2013, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/us/huge-amounts-spent-on
-immigration-study-finds.html?_r=0.
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Against Women Act have faced significant opposition in part because they
extended benefits to “illegal immigrants.”119
With their claim to being American already, DREAMers effectively dis-
rupted this contemporary narrative of illegality. The narrative described in sec-
tion I.B, supra, shifts the focus from legality/illegality to worthiness and
blamelessness, asserting their American-ness to question the focus on illegality.
Particularly in contrast to the greater population of immigrants who are called
upon to pay fines, stand in the back of the line, and “earn” citizenship, the
DREAM movement’s effectiveness suggests that it is doing something
powerfully different from the general political discourse around immigrants.
Michael A. Olivas has written of the unique political space occupied by
DREAMers, and those benefiting from Plyler v. Doe’s rejection of alienage-
based discrimination in the context of public education:
[The students] have a resilience and persistence held by few native citizens—who are
born at an advantage, relative to these students . . . . That they succeed under
extraordinary circumstances is remarkable to virtually all who observe them. These
students’ success partially explains why so many educators and legislators have
accepted Plyler and worked to assist them in navigating the complexities of school
and college. Despite the success of anti-immigrant rhetoric in shaping a discourse
and of restrictionists in fashioning resentments, reasonable legislators of both parties
have attempted to address the issues these students face, notwithstanding the political
blowback.120
The overwhelming focus on illegality in popular discourse necessitated
this different vision, and the DREAM emphasis on the blamelessness and wor-
thiness of these immigrant youth created that alternative political space.
B. The Impossibility of Transitioning to Citizenship
Beyond disrupting the narrative of illegality and providing a different
framework to advance their goals, the DREAMers have also had to contend
with the fact that there is no existing path to help them realize their goal of
matching their identity as Americans to a legal status as U.S. citizens. The
absolute lack of a path to regularize their immigration status means that, for
DREAMers, there is no possibility (yet) for transitioning to the ultimate, full
membership of citizenship, a transition that has been integral to the vision of
America as a “nation of immigrants.” This section first explores how the
DREAMers fit into existing theories of immigrant transition and integration,
and then explains how transition is impossible for the DREAMers under cur-
rent law, showing how the DREAMers have crafted their legislative strategy to
build back into America’s immigration law a way to make transitions possible.
119 Frank James, Some Political Lessons from the Violence Against Women Act Vote, NPR
(Feb. 28, 2103, 5:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/02/28/173181346
/some-political-lessons-from-the-violence-against-women-act-vote. Professor Mariela
Olivares is exploring this political dynamic in her forthcoming article on political decision-
making for non-citizens, particularly immigrant women. Mariela Olivares, The Politics of
Subordination: How Identity Affects Battered Immigrants (Oct. 7, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
120 Michael A. Olivas, The Political Efficacy of Plyler v. Doe: The Danger and the Dis-
course, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2011).
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1. Seeing DREAMers as Americans in Waiting
In his influential book AMERICANS IN WAITING, Hiroshi Motomura has set
forth a series of conceptual frameworks for how the law has considered immi-
gration, including both “immigration as contract” (whereby the rights and
expectations for immigrants are treated as no more and no less than the terms of
a contract) and “immigration as affiliation” (whereby the nation recognizes that
immigrants become more citizen-like over time as they develop the ties and
loyalties that shift their identities toward being American, whether or not they
ultimately become citizens formally). Under “immigration as contract,” the
answer to the DREAMers’ situation is clear and simple: they have not been
granted permission to enter or remain, so they have not entered into a contract
with the government, and can be excluded or removed at any time (although an
argument can be made about tacit consent to their presence as a form of con-
tract).121 As Motomura explains in his book, this view of immigration has
diluted over generations from its purest, strongest formulations in the late 19th
century, although the concept does retain some force, and certainly speaks to
the concerns driving the emphasis on “illegal immigration” described above.
“Immigration as affiliation” effectively captures the DREAMer self-identifica-
tion as being more citizen-like over time, but provides them no path to having
that affiliation recognized through the granting of formal status as citizens. The
concept of immigration as affiliation shows up only in limited ways in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, such as cancellation of removal, a form of
relief from removal available to those who have lived long enough in the U.S.
and formed deep enough attachments to merit a chance at remaining.122 For
various reasons, including statutory eligibility and the cap placed on cancella-
tion applications, the remedies in immigration law that support the idea of
“immigration as affiliation” do little to help the DREAMers.
Motomura’s third framework, “immigration as transition,” most vividly
illustrates how the system has broken down with respect to DREAMers. In
“immigration as transition,” immigrants are “Americans in waiting” who have
presumed equality as they march toward and await formal citizenship. Such a
view of immigration sees immigrants arriving in one status but taking the nec-
essary steps to deepen their legal ties, ultimately by seeking citizenship through
naturalization. For Motomura, “immigration as transition” explicitly encour-
ages immigrants to move toward naturalization: indeed, in this view, immigra-
tion itself is defined relative to naturalization with an expectation that
naturalization is the normal end result of the act of emigrating.123 The obvious,
but often unstated, sine qua non of this vision is the existence of a path to
naturalization. But for DREAMers who would like nothing more than to transi-
tion to a formal status as citizens, no such path exists, and the normal end result
of naturalization is simply not possible.
121 Motomura, Who Belongs?, supra note 71, at 376.
122 INA § 240A(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012)).
123
“[I]mmigration as affiliation is also appealing because it is conveniently neutral on the
very difficult question of whether the integration of immigrants into American society
should be a goal of government policy . . . . If ties emerge, immigration as affiliation recog-
nizes them.” AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 8, at 89–90.
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The DREAMers provide a compelling example of “immigration as affilia-
tion” and of another vision of citizenship that considers the intending-citizens’
ties, connections, and contributions. Jus nexi citizenship—citizenship based on
“rootedness”—has been theorized by Ayelet Shachar and is closest to that pos-
ited by the DREAMers themselves. The individuals most connected, most
“rooted” in American society, should be recognized as citizens, per her argu-
ment.124 She writes,
The idea of taking root as a basis for earning entitlement has been familiar to the
common-law tradition for centuries. It was brilliantly captured in Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ resounding words: “a thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own
for a long time, whether property or opinion, takes root in your being . . . , however
you came by it.”125
Although Shachar does not specifically limit jus nexi to DREAMers, she
does use the DREAMers to illustrate her argued need for a new way of thinking
about earned citizenship.126 In her model, formality would yield to factual
determinations of “where he or she actually lives, where his or her center of
interests lie, and where, as a result, to place the legal bond [of citizenship]
having as its basis the social fact of attachment.”127 She looks to specific rela-
tionships individual immigrants have formed, from family to career to commu-
nity to assess whether someone is sufficiently rooted and sufficiently engaged
in U.S. society to merit citizenship.128
The jus nexi vision of citizenship would trade the relatively objective
markers of the birthright citizenship and naturalization, for more subjective fac-
tors, creating a functional and necessarily discretionary analysis of the exis-
tence of citizenship. Shachar’s elaboration of jus nexi relies repeatedly on ideas
of “earning” citizenship, reflecting the idea’s roots in property law and concep-
tions of New Property, where ownership is connected with the question of who
most valuably uses the property.129 By opening up citizenship even further to
the content of citizen-like behaviors, this vision of citizenship marks the fur-
thest expansion of the question of worthiness into the granting of citizenship.
As will be discussed infra Part III.B, jus nexi citizenship shares with naturaliza-
tion the quality of absorbing and reflecting specifically named values. Jus nexi
citizenship differs, however, (beyond its normative content) by emerging
through the common law and not through legislation. Given ways in which
adjudicators reflect the society around them, however,130 this may simply shift
the phenomenon to a different venue while not significantly changing it.
2. The Impossibility of Transition
While Motomura’s and Shachar’s scholarship create frameworks for
understanding why unauthorized immigrants, including the DREAMers,
124 Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 113 (2011).
125 Id. at 113–14.
126 Id. at 118–21.
127 Id. at 132 (internal quotations omitted).
128 Id. at 143–45.
129 Id. at 123–26.
130 Keyes, supra note 72, at 57–58.
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deserve a path toward full integration131—which would include legal status—
as the law stands presently, no such path exists. Indeed, considering “immigra-
tion as transition,” the DREAMers’ lack of status is fundamental, for there can
be no transition to formal citizenship status without lawful immigration status
beforehand. Only lawful permanent residents can apply for naturalization.132
However, for many immigrants, there is simply no path to lawful permanent
resident status; this is especially true in the case of immigrants whose initial
arrival was unlawful.133 Those without a path include immigrants present with
valid temporary (“nonimmigrant”) visas, such as students or temporary agricul-
tural workers who cannot find a family member or employer to sponsor them
for permanent residence (an “immigrant visa”).134 Also without a path are
those without any lawful immigration status whatsoever, a category that
includes both those who entered lawfully at the outset but overstayed their
visas, and those whose initial entrance was unlawful, or “without inspec-
tion.”135 Visa-overstayers may be able to adjust status to permanent residence
through marriage to a citizen, but they may have committed other civil viola-
tions while living in the shadows that make their quest for legal immigration
status very difficult.136 The vast majority of those whose initial entrance was
131 In his recent scholarship, Motomura is extending his framework to examine how
DREAMers and other undocumented immigrants can be—and need to be—seen as in transi-
tion, despite the absence of any legal path permitting it. He sets out arguments based upon
contract (noting the implicit acceptance of the presence of undocumented immigrants) and
affiliation (noting “the various mechanisms in immigration law for recognizing the roots that
unauthorized migrants put down”). Motomura, Who Belongs?, supra note 71, at 373–74,
376. Because those two justifications exist—and the merits of those justifications, he con-
cedes, are contested—it is possible to look at unauthorized immigrants as “in transition,” and
question the best manner of addressing that transition for the purpose of promoting integra-
tion, which “is the key to a civic solidarity that is consistent with equality and individual
dignity” and therefore helps reconcile the tension between borders and equality. Id. at 365.
132 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012) (“No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
shall be naturalized unless such applicant . . . has resided continuously, after being lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, within the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)).
133 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1255(a) (2012). There are some exceptions for certain crime
survivors, those with a well-founded fear of persecution in their home countries, and others
could potentially have inadmissibility waived if their deportation would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen spouse or child. Still others who arrived
before 2001 and had a U.S. citizen relative petition for them before April 30, 2001, may still
adjust their status; the numbers of people in such categories is trivial, however, compared to
the number of DREAMers likely to be living in the U.S. presently—estimated at 1.76 mil-
lion. Jeanne Batalova & Michelle Mittelstadt, Relief from Deportation: Demographic Profile
of the DREAMers Potentially Eligible Under the Deferred Action Policy, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (Aug. 2012), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/fs24_deferredaction.pdf.
134 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2012).
135 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012).
136 Vargas, for example, declared on employment forms that he had U.S. citizenship, a
ground of inadmissibility that is very difficult to waive. His essay coming out as undocu-
mented details this and many other issues that would trigger analysis of his likely inadmissi-
bility for citizenship, absent any special exceptions or waivers. Vargas, Outlaw, supra note
46.
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illegal are not eligible to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence, even
if they have citizen spouses, parents, or children.137
DREAMers therefore lack the first critical element of eligibility for formal
citizenship through naturalization, and the sine qua non for being immigrants
“in transition”: lawful permanent residence.138 Without a means to acquiring
lawful permanent residence, it simply does not matter that DREAMers meet all
the other normative criteria for citizenship enshrined in U.S. naturalization law:
patriotism, virtue, and community ties. For them, there is no line to stand in,
and no path to the dream short of specialized legislation. It is this group, for
whom no path toward citizenship exists, that Jose Antonio Vargas had in mind
when he talked with Bill O’Reilly, and for whom O’Reilly agreed that there
needed to be “a process.”139 And it is this purpose that the DREAM Act meets.
Although the DREAMer narrative speaks of already being American, the Act
itself would simply provide initial lawful immigration status, from which the
DREAMers could eventually—if all goes smoothly—apply for citizenship
through naturalization.140
While providing DREAMers an opportunity for lawful permanent resi-
dence (and thereby a path to naturalization) is the proposed remedy, amending
naturalization law to immediately make DREAMers citizens would better
reflect the sense that they are already American. Because naturalization
requirements are statutory, and amendable through legislation (as opposed to
birthright citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment, which would require
a constitutional amendment to change), it would be possible for Congress to
amend the naturalization law to allow the DREAMers to apply immediately for
status as citizens. Unfortunately, such a move is utterly impractical in our cur-
rent political era. With the discourse on illegality, it is impossible to imagine
such a transition from undocumented status to citizen without some intermedi-
ate stage legalizing the individuals’ status and requiring them to “earn” their
formal citizenship.
Thus the DREAM movement’s strategy handles the question of illegality
in two ways, first by countering it, and second by adapting to it. First, it
attempts to soften rhetoric around illegality by painting a counter-narrative
about immigrants that picks up threads of America’s immigration mythology,
offering the public—and Congress—a different lens through which to view
these young men and women who seem worthy, blameless, and “already Amer-
ican.” In this way, the worthiness narrative asserted by the DREAMers was a
conscious choice driven by the lack of space in the ever-narrowing political
137 A U.S. citizen can petition for an undocumented spouse who entered illegally, but that
spouse needs to leave the country to have the paperwork processed. Leaving the country
triggers, for most immigrants, a ten-year bar against re-entry, which can only be waived
upon a showing of extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen spouse. The Obama Administration,
while unable to remove this barrier to lawful immigration status absent Congressional action,
eased the process of seeking a waiver, allowing undocumented individuals to apply for and
wait for the waiver while still in the United States. Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers
of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate Relatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 536 (Jan. 3, 2013) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212).
138 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
139 Interview by Bill O’Reilly with Jose Antonio Vargas, supra note 51.
140 DREAM Act of 2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. §§ 3, 5 (2011).
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discourse of immigration. And yet second, the DREAMers’ strategy implicitly
adopts the illegality narrative by admitting that they are not already American
(“just not legally,” as the Time Magazine cover noted141) by seeking a process
for achieving initial legal status as a means of transitioning to citizenship,
instead of amending naturalization law to seek immediate citizenship.
C. Claiming Citizenship Radically; Seeking a Path Pragmatically
The DREAMers’ cause, rooted in their subjective project of defining
“American,” embodies citizenship as identity at a time when citizenship as
legal status is the preeminent viewpoint on membership. The DREAM narra-
tive emphasizes citizenship as identity while the strategy focuses on citizenship
as status. The DREAMers’ inability to have their legal status match their self-
identity vividly illustrates the existing limitations of “citizenship as legal sta-
tus,” and its vividness helps explain the normative force of the DREAMers’
movement, and their success at gaining unexpected allies.142 The DREAMers
show America that citizenship as legal status creates a problem of under-inclu-
sion: individuals who are already “good citizens” should be included within the
formal framework of citizenship.
In contrast with the existing and imagined visions of citizenship set forth
above, it is truly novel that the DREAMers claim their own citizenship, even in
the absence of a legal framework to support that view. In citizenship and natu-
ralization law, and even in the jus nexi vision of citizenship, citizenship and its
elements are defined by the polity whom the immigrant seeks to join. The
DREAMers have a different starting place: the would-be citizen’s self-percep-
tion. Self-perception matters profoundly to the DREAMer narrative of “already
being American.” They often define themselves as Americans—individuals
whose subjective self-perception is that they are already citizens without the
legal paperwork to prove it. There is therefore a more radical underpinning to
the discourse that citizenship is something that can be claimed, and not simply
something that must be granted by the state. The strength of this vision is the
role it gives to the individual to demonstrate the behaviors that constitute being
a “good citizen”—a set of factors defined around civic participation, loyalty to
the United States, and perhaps time spent in the United States.
The potential shift of power in this vision is profound. Although the his-
tory of citizenship in English and American common law creates some space,
discussed briefly below, to imagine such a radical power shift, the DREAMers
themselves do not seek such a restructuring. The DREAMers articulate ideas
that push their audience toward seeing citizenship, and “defining American,” in
new ways. Still, they recognize that the correct political course is not to place
citizenship in this radical setting because such a dramatic power shift might
alienate a large swath of the electorate. Instead, DREAMers have sought an
exception to the existing legal regime that would put them on the path to natu-
ralization in an orderly way—even if the motivations for that exception are
141 Vargas, We Are Americans, supra note 50.
142 Vargas also found an open ear in Tea Party Patriots leader Mark Meckler (description of
encounter posted on his Facebook). Jose Antonio Vargas, Wall Post from July 14, 2012,
FACEBOOK (July 14, 2012), https://www.facebook.com/joseiswriting?fref=ts.
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fully based upon rootedness principles and the importance of self-perception as
citizens.
D. DREAMers Changing the Story of Race and Citizenship
The DREAM movement stands out for another reason, beyond its asser-
tion of citizenship against the prevailing winds of restriction. The history of
citizenship in the United States has always also been equally a history of race,
but the DREAMers constitute a multi-racial movement focused entirely on the
question of who is worthy of full membership. Although some of the notions of
worthiness and blamelessness implicitly perpetuate questions of race,143 the
movement deserves to be celebrated as a departure from the troubled history of
race and citizenship in the United States. This section begins with a synthesis of
literature showing how race and citizenship have always been connected in
U.S. history, and turns to ways in which race vexes the DREAMers’ efforts to
navigate the existing pipeline to citizenship.
1. Race and Citizenship-Acquisition Historically
Before the Fourteenth Amendment, African-Americans could not be rec-
ognized as citizens, whether slave or free. Beyond the infamous provision in
the original Constitution declaring that slaves constitutes three-fifths of a per-
son, the Supreme Court itself determined in Dred Scott v. Sandford that even
when free, black Americans could not be considered citizens.144 The Four-
teenth Amendment not only corrected that wrong with respect to African-
Americans, but established the principle of jus soli citizenship in U.S. law,
providing the cleanest, clearest, and most abiding definition of who has citizen-
ship in America: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside.”145 Although the question of who is “subject to the
jurisdiction thereof” has recently been debated,146 the principle that the Four-
teenth Amendment covers all those born in the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction, including the children of unauthorized immigrants, was upheld by
143 Discussed infra Part III.C.
144 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 430 (1856).
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Mark Shawhan provides a thorough analysis of how race
mattered to the creation of jus soli citizenship. Mark Shawhan, “By Virtue of Being Born
Here”: Birthright Citizenship and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1,
6 (discussing how “antebellum state courts, largely in the South, ignored extant precedents
on citizenship acquisition in favor of a racially based consensualist doctrine”). Shawhan also
points to contemporaneous voices noting and decrying this divergence, such as Republic
James Wilson of Iowa:
Wilson started with Blackstone’s articulation of the principle that “natural-born subjects are such
as are born within the dominions of the Crown of England . . . as it is generally called, the
allegiance of the king.” This principle, which “applies to this country as well as to England . . .
makes a man a subject in England, and a citizen here,’ without ‘distinction on account of race or
color.”
Id. at 23 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866)).
146 Katrina Trinko, The New Immigration Debate, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2011, 4:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/257647/new-immigration-debate-katrina
-trinko.
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the Supreme Court in 1898 in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, and has been
undisturbed since then.147
The expansion of jus soli citizenship merely deals with the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it stands apart from explicit and implicit racial underpinnings
of immigration and naturalization statutes in early American history. Explicitly,
prior to passage of the Fourteenth Amendment—the first naturalization law—
the Naturalization Act of 1790 limited naturalization to “free white per-
son[s].”148 By the mid-19th century, Congress had passed the American Home-
stead Act, which, although not expressly racial in nature, was structured to
encourage European settlers to become American citizens. The Act was passed
in response to concern about the relative emptiness of the still new western
territories. The Act excluded people of African ancestry because it was limited
to those who could become citizens—and, at that time, black people could not
be citizens, per Dred Scott.149 Although not nominally an immigration law, the
government actively promoted this policy in Europe to encourage immigrants
to participate, and to build the stock of future citizens. European immigrants
were welcome to partake in the homesteading process so long as they signed a
declaration of their intent to become citizens when eligible after five years.150
Indeed, the five-year homesteading period coincided with the five-year waiting
period before citizenship could be obtained, so during the homesteading, these
147 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688, 705 (1898). This seminal case
defining jus soli citizenship shows comfort with a full range of foreign-born individuals
seeking the protection of the state. Although Ark concerns itself with the specific question of
the citizenship of children born in the United States, the Court noted in dicta that a justifica-
tion for extending citizenship to those born within a nation’s borders existed whether the
parents had any formal allegiance to the nation in the first place. The reciprocal relationship
between the governed and the government exists regardless of whether the governed are
citizens or whether they had formally sworn allegiance:
The principle [of birthright citizenship] embraced all persons born within the king’s allegiance,
and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual . . . and were not
restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of
allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom.
Id. at 655 (emphasis added). The tradition of mutual protection and loyalty articulated by the
phrase “aliens in amity” mirrors the fluidity that often exists among different immigration
statuses: formal legal designations may differ, but an essential relationship between the gov-
ernment and the governed stays constant. DREAMers are the quintessential “aliens in
amity,” seeing themselves already as American, and speaking frequently about their commit-
ment to the United States and desire to give back to the country where they were raised—
and as the Plyler court powerfully asserted, the undocumented of today could be the citizens
of tomorrow, and extending public education to children became essential to maintaining the
“amity” part—for who would be more likely to be an “alien in amity” than an individual
who shared the quintessential American experience of graduating from public school. See
Hiroshi Motomura, Making Legal: The DREAM Act, Birthright Citizenship, and Broad-
Scale Legalization, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1131–32 (2012).
148 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103.
149 Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392.
150 Id.; see, e.g., KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR:
1820–1924 36 (1984); Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immi-
gration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1405 (2009).
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were “Americans in waiting,” developing the ties and loyalties that were ulti-
mately recognized by the granting of citizenship through naturalization.151
The 1880s saw a return to explicit racism in naturalization laws with the
Chinese Exclusion Act, the decades-long prohibition of Asian migration, and
the explicit denial of naturalization for Asians. In brief, the mid-19th century
arrival of Asian—and specifically Chinese—immigrants that was instrumental
in the building of the railroads from the West Coast to the center of the country
(where they connected with the rails constructed largely by Irish immigrants),
became a political flashpoint after the rails were completed and the economy
was in recession.152 Much like during the anti-immigrant policies emerging in
the recessions of the early 21st century, immigrants received the blame for a
large number of social ills, including undercutting American labor during the
Gold Rush,153 leading to calls for their banishment. It was in this context that
Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, banning the immigration of Chi-
nese nationals.154
In upholding the constitutionality of the Act and subsequent pieces of leg-
islation providing for the deportation of Asian immigrants,155 the Supreme
Court relied on language shocking to modern ears. The court noted that it
“seemed impossible for [the Chinese] to assimilate” and described the “great
danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by
them.”156 The court continued by asserting that “their immigration was in num-
bers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to
our civilization.”157 Indeed, even those defending the rights of the Chinese to
151 AMERICANS IN WAITING, supra note 8, at 8–9. As Motomura would likely note, such ties
were not required under a view of immigration as transition (as contrasted with immigration
as affiliation, where such ties are central). Nonetheless, for many, if not most, of those home-
steading for several years, such ties almost certainly developed, just as those ties exist for
DREAMers today by virtue of the time they have spent in the United States, studying, work-
ing, and beginning families.
152 See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of
Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
153 Chae Chan Ping documents the origins of the conflict in terms of the negative effects on
American workers much as current debates do:
They were generally industrious and frugal.  Not being accompanied by families, except in rare
instances, their expenses were small; and they were content with the simplest fare, such as would
not suffice for our laborers and artisans. The competition between them and our people was for
this reason altogether in their favor, and the consequent irritation, proportionately deep and bit-
ter, was followed, in many cases, by open conflicts, to the great disturbance of the public peace.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
154 As Chae Chan Ping describes it, “events were transpiring on the Pacific coast which
soon dissipated the anticipations indulged as to the benefits to follow the immigration of
Chinese to this country.” Id. at 593.
155 The Court upheld the constitutionality by establishing that immigration power was ple-
nary, assigned to the political branches of government, and largely immune to judicial
review. Id. at 609.
156 Id. at 595.
157 Id. Notably, when Mr. Chae did leave, the New York Times described him as “a Chi-
nese gentleman who has given the United States courts a great deal of trouble in his endeav-
ors to force his unwelcome presence upon the citizens of this fair and free country.” Chan
Ping Leaves U.S.: He Refuses to Pay his Fare and the Company Takes Him as a Guest, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1889.
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remain in the United States used the language of race, upholding rights despite
the how “obnoxious” the Chinese might be.158 From Chae Chan Ping through
Fong Yue Ting, the constitutionalization of the federal immigration power was
thus racialized from its inception. Statutes flowing from this largely unchecked
power continued the pattern of explicit racial bias in immigration laws, includ-
ing the blanket ban on the naturalization of Asians,159 and the national-origins
quota system established in 1924, which “stimulated the production of illegal
aliens,” as historian Mae Ngai has described the period.160
Although the legal history of Mexican migration to the United States dif-
fers sharply from that of Asian migration, the history shares the same pattern of
racialization. The 1917 Immigration Act doubled the tax to be paid by immi-
grants upon entry, and added a literacy test as a requirement for entry, both of
which were designed to deter would-be Mexican immigrants.161 Likewise, long
after medical inspections were terminated at Ellis Island and other ports of
entry (replaced by medical screening at consulates), Mexicans had to endure
humiliating naked inspections, delousing, and other screens at their entry to the
United States.162 The Border Patrol treated its mission as one of crime-control
at that time, spreading its enforcement efforts into the interior in unregulated
ways until the Attorney General set the functional equivalent of the border as
100 miles from the actual, political border.163 As Ngai has written,
It was ironic that Mexicans became so associated with illegal immigration because,
unlike Europeans, they were not subject to numerical quotas and, unlike Asiatics,
they were not excluded as racially ineligible to citizenship. But as numerical restric-
tion assumed primacy in immigration policy, its enforcement aspects—inspection
procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol, criminal prosecution, and irregular cate-
gories of immigration—created many thousands of illegal Mexican immigrants. The
undocumented Mexican laborer who crossed the border to work in the burgeoning
industry of commercial agriculture emerged as the prototypical illegal alien.164
During this time, although categories for deportation were not explicitly limited
to Mexican or Asian immigrants, only 1% of those deported came from
Europe.165
158 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
159 Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
160 Ngai, Strange Career, supra note 80, at 70. Ngai assesses how the quota system had a
differential impact upon European immigrants, compared with immigrants from other
regions, at least partly because European immigrants could migrate legally after spending
five years in Canada, and once here lawfully could petition for family members to arrive
without being subjected to quota restrictions. Id. at 84. Ngai also demonstrates how provi-
sions to temper the rise in “illegal” immigrants were restricted to Europeans. Id. at 102–03
(discussing the “pre-examination” process, a precursor to modern-day I-601 waivers of
inadmissibility).
161 Id. at 82.
162 Id. at 85.
163 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012) provides for warrantless searches of automobiles within a
reasonable distance of the border, as determined by the Attorney General. Regulations have
set that distance as 100 miles from the border. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2013).
164 NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 19, at 71.
165 Id. at 18.
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The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965166 theoretically did away
with most of these exclusions and contributed to a dramatic shift in the
demographics of the United States.167 Scholars point to the way that the hard-
ship stories of immigrants of color began to resonate on par with those of white
immigrants.168 Questions of race endure, however, and affect every stage of the
immigration pipeline, as explored in the section below.
2. Race and Citizenship Today: The Immigration Pipeline
To understand the legal status of the DREAMers, it is useful to turn briefly
to the immigration process, considering it as a pipeline toward citizenship, with
entries and exits along the way. Although extremely oversimplified below,
merely looking at the points of (1) entering, (2) staying, and (3) naturalizing,
this image provides a way to understand why and how concepts of worthiness
and race enter into immigration decisions.
a. Entry
Entry to the United States can occur in any number of ways, from legal
entry for temporary purposes (such as study, tourism, or business), or legal
entry for permanent residence (available through petitions filed by certain close
family members who are already permanent residents or citizens, or by busi-
nesses hiring long-term workers, among other avenues), to illegal entry—cross-
ing a border without being inspected by an immigration officer. A popular
critique of the last category—illegal border crossers—is that they should have
“gotten in line” as did those in the first two categories, but a closer examination
of those two categories shows how limited, and sometimes non-existent, such
lines are.
Temporary visas are issued by U.S. consulates overseas, and these consul-
ates have full, unreviewable discretion to issue visas or not.169 This non-
reviewability exists because the alternative is potentially the creation of an
extraordinary caseload of appeals requiring resources beyond anything politi-
cally feasible. Non-reviewability does, however, carry with it the risk of dis-
criminatory decision-making, difficult to detect and almost impossible to
overcome. The discriminatory practices of a consulate in Brazil came to light
only because of a whistle-blowing employee.170 The practices uncovered there
showed discrimination based upon race, gender, and class. Moreover, the coun-
tries where these decisions must be made in the first place reflect certain class
and race preferences, as citizens from most European countries need not seek a
visa at all; these countries are part of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, and sim-
166 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911.
167 Charles B. Keely, Effects of the Immigration Act of 1965 on Selected Population Char-
acteristics of Immigrants to the United States, 8 DEMOGRAPHY 157, 157, 168 (1971); see
also Ludden, supra note 105.
168 See NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 19, at 2.
169 See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66
WASH. L. REV. 1, 25–35 (1991).
170 Philip Shenon, Judge Denounces U.S. Visa Policies Based on Race or Looks, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/23/world/judge
-denounces-us-visa-policies-based-on-race-or-looks.html.
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ply possessing a passport from one of those countries permits the individual to
visit the U.S. without being issued a special visa.171
Miguel172 illustrates the high burden that this unreviewable visa system
places upon certain would-be visitors to enter the United States lawfully.
Miguel lived in El Salvador, where he had middle-class, steady employment
with a quasi-governmental agency. Miguel’s son, Juan, was a lawful permanent
resident (LPR) of the United States, where he lived with his mother (also an
LPR, romantically still involved with Miguel, but never married to him, and
therefore unable to share her immigration status with him). Juan, at age eleven,
was diagnosed with a terminal heart condition that could kill him at any time,
and he was unlikely to survive more than a year or two at best. Miguel sought a
visa to enter as a tourist to visit his son and was denied twice. The family in the
U.S. had their local Congressional representative write a letter to the consulate
seeking a different decision, and the consulate replied that Miguel could not be
granted a visa because his return to El Salvador “could not be guaranteed.” The
assumption that Miguel, a Latino from a country with a significant population
of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., was a risk for overstaying his visa
overwhelmed the humanitarian considerations of the situation. Eventually,
Miguel was able to enter through a special program known as humanitarian
parole, and he stayed three weeks before returning, well within the time permit-
ted to him. Had Miguel not received humanitarian parole and chosen to emi-
grate unlawfully, he would have become one of the 11 million undocumented
who are so often told to “stand in line.” In Miguel’s case, however, no such line
would have even been available.
Indeed, the idea that there are readily available lines for orderly immigra-
tion is one of the most pervasive misunderstandings affecting the debate over
immigration reform. Politicians from both parties adopt the rhetoric of “getting
to the back of the line” without ever acknowledging that, for many people,
there is no line. Even where lawful immigration routes exist (perhaps through
close family members), per-country annual quotas exist so that no country may
claim more than 7% of immigrant visas annually no matter the demand from a
particular country.173 This means that some stand in line for years or, in some
cases, decades.174 For those without a relative or employer to sponsor them,
and without the ability to easily procure a visitor visa, there simply is no way to
join the line. As Mae Ngai wrote in the New York Times, “When critics admon-
ish prospective immigrants—as well as the 11 million plus undocumented
migrants currently in America—to ‘go to the back of the line,’ they should
realize that for many people the line is a cruel joke.”175 The joke is particularly
171 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2012) (Visa Waiver Program for Certain Visitors).
172 Although the name is changed to protect his identity, Miguel is a real person, the father
of a former client of the author.
173 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2) (2012).
174 The February 2013 State Department Visa Bulletin shows that the shortest line for enter-
ing with permanent residence is for spouses of lawful permanent residents, who have to wait
approximately three years; their children must wait between eight and eleven years. Married
children must wait between ten and twenty years. Visa Bulletin for Feb. 2013,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV (Feb. 2013), http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5856
.html.
175 Ngai, Reforming Immigration, supra note 76.
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strong for immigrants of color, as Kevin Johnson has studied, noting
“[i]mportantly, the abolition of the national origins quota system, though
removing blatant discrimination from the immigration laws, failed to cleanse
all remnants of racism. Various characteristics of the modern immigration laws,
though facially neutral, disparately impact noncitizens of color from developing
nations.”176 Because the ability to enter lawfully determines the ability to sub-
sequently adjust to lawful permanent residence, these racial disparities at the
outset matter for the rest of the pipeline.
b. Remaining
For those who do come to the United States lawfully, maintaining the right
to stay in the pipeline to citizenship requires exemplary behavior. Since 1996,
immigrants with any interaction with the criminal justice system put themselves
at high risk of deportation.177 For example, a theft conviction may make an
immigrant removable, whether it was shoplifting a carton of cigarettes or some-
thing much more substantial, because theft offenses are considered crimes
involving moral turpitude (CIMTs)—and a CIMT committed within five years
of admission, or two CIMTs committed at any time, render immigrants remov-
able178 and generally preclude any discretionary relief.179 Likewise, in New
York, turnstile jumping could render an immigrant removable.180 Jennifer
Chaco´n has examined this increasing conflation of the criminal and immigra-
tion systems, noting “[t]he 1996 immigration laws were not only the product of
a world view that conflated ‘illegal immigrants’ with crime—the laws also
operated to reify the links between all immigrants and criminality.”181
The story of Mariana182 illustrates this problem. Mariana entered the U.S.
as an eight-year old with lawful permanent residence. She and her mother
moved in with a cousin who began sexually abusing Mariana. The abuse con-
tinued over a four-year period and escalated to rape. The cousin was ultimately
176 Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
“Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1133 (1998); see also Olivas
& Bowman, supra note 91, at 265.
177 See generally MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY:
A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS (4th ed. 2009); Jason A. Cade, The
Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751,
1754 (2013).
178 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012).
179 See, e.g., Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children 1 (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1
-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
180 Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Lim-
ited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1941 (2000).
181 Chaco´n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 68, at 1843; see also Jenny Roberts, Why Mis-
demeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297–98 (2011) (emphasizing the extent to which minor criminal convic-
tions can carry significant collateral consequences for immigration).
182 Mariana is another client whose name and certain details have been changed to protect
her identity.
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convicted and jailed, but Mariana received little support for the trauma she
endured, and she turned to alcohol and then marijuana and cocaine for relief.
She amassed several marijuana possession convictions and one cocaine convic-
tion which ultimately led to the government placing her in both immigration
detention183 and removal proceedings. She ultimately found relief through a
provision of immigration law known as Cancellation of Removal by proving
that her U.S. citizen children would suffer extreme and exceptionally unusual
hardship if their mother were deported, but the case was hard-fought and shows
the tenuousness of her lawful permanent residence.
The confluence of this criminalization of immigration with questions of
race is abundantly clear. Jason Cade has laid out in alarming detail the multi-
layered ways the distortions and failures of process in misdemeanor courts
ensnare noncitizens, and particularly noncitizens of color.184 Unsurprisingly,
data on who has been removed from the United States based upon any kind of
criminal conviction185 show that the top ten countries of removal are countries
with predominantly non-white populations.186 Notably, this data only accounts
for those whose reason for removal was a criminal conviction, and not those
who were removed for committing the immigration offense of being present
without admission or without status.187 A significant number of these latter
groups, however, come to the attention of Homeland Security after being
booked, arrested, or detained in the criminal justice system. Homeland Security
has the authority to initiate removal proceedings regardless of whether the
unauthorized individual is ultimately convicted of any criminal charge, let
alone convicted of an offense that would be grounds for removal in and of
itself. For example, an individual arrested and charged with drunk and disor-
derly conduct, a charge that is often dismissed, could still face removal pro-
ceedings for simply being present without admission after being screened for
immigration status by local law enforcement during the booking process. Law
enforcement cooperation with civil immigration authorities, combined with the
poor quality of justice available in misdemeanor dockets, dramatically limits
the chances an immigrant has of avoiding deportation for even minor infrac-
tions of the law, and thus removes many immigrants—and largely immigrants
of color—from the pipeline to citizenship.188
183 Drug offenses, other than possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, subject immi-
grants to mandatory detention while their cases are being litigated, a period of time that can
last many months (and for Mariana, lasted well over a year). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B),
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
184
 Cade, supra note 177, at 1757–63.
185 Criminal convictions (which include guilty pleas and deferred sentencing agreements,
among others) affect a would-be immigrant’s initial admissibility under INA § 212, and can
render an immigrant removable under INA § 237. See KRAMER, supra note 177, at 187.
186 Data for 2012 has been compiled by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC). U.S. Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR., http://
trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/deport_filing_charge.php (last visited Nov. 14,
2013) (finding the top ten countries were Mexico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Jamaica, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Colombia and Vietnam).
187 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012).
188 Cade, supra note 177, at 1754.
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c. Naturalizing
Naturalization is the end of the pipeline to citizenship and here, too, ques-
tions of worthiness and race enter the analysis. As Kevin Johnson has written,
naturalization is a “magic mirror” for understanding whom a nation-state most
wants to include as full members of the polity.189 Over the centuries, those
desirable traits have included various periods of residency,190 proficiency in
English,191 and for much of the history of naturalization in the United States,
being white.192 Explicit race barriers and quotas ended by 1965,193 but the use
of naturalization law to encompass other aspects of desirability continues, as
discussed below.
The way naturalization, or “acquired-citizenship,” can incorporate evolv-
ing ideas about worthiness contrasts with the two forms of birthright citizen-
ship: jus soli and jus sanguinis. Jus soli citizenship (citizenship by place of
birth) captures an important value of openness underlying U.S. citizenship, one
that makes America unusual among nation-states.194 Questions of parentage
and worth simply do not enter into the jus soli equation. Place of birth and
being subject to U.S. jurisdiction are the only facts that matter for jus soli citi-
zenship, and neither ascribes any particular values to the individual child in
question. Implicit in the analysis is some small degree of connection to
America, by virtue of having at least one parent present in America at the birth,
but more significant is the implicit understanding that persons born in America
are likely to maintain ties to America—something that is not a foregone con-
clusion—but that meshes with our self-perception as a “nation of
immigrants.”195
189 Johnson, supra note 176, at 1114.
190 A 14 year residency period was required from 1798 through 1802, but a five year period
has been more typical (and exists currently for all but those who derive lawful permanent
residence through marriage to a U.S. citizen). Compare Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, §1, 1
Stat. 566, with 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
191 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1) (2012).
192 See supra Part II.D.1 (discussion of race-based history of naturalization and exclusion of
Asian immigrants).
193 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911.
194 See J.M. Mancini & Graham Finlay, “Citizenship Matters”: Lessons from the Irish Citi-
zenship Referendum, 60 AM. Q. 575, 576–77 (2008) (assessing the countervailing trends in
Europe). Moreover, the form of jus soli citizenship that exists in the United States is a
particularly strongly defined commitment to extending citizenship to all but a very small
number of those born on U.S. soil. See Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the Immigration
Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175, 205–09 (2010).
195 Jus soli citizenship gives primacy to the place of birth, drawing on the English and
American common law traditions that recognized the reciprocity and mutual loyalty that
needs to exist between the government and the governed. Wong Kim Ark suggests that any
other interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would create a conundrum for those who
already feel American:
To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the chil-
dren, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries, would be to deny
citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German or other European parent-
age, who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898) (emphasis added). This implicit
recognition of pre-existing ties to the United States comes after lengthy discussion of the
common law of citizenship, which established an idea that birth in a country created a pow-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 37 21-JAN-14 17:19
Fall 2013] DEFINING AMERICAN 137
Jus sanguinis citizenship (citizenship through blood)196 recognizes the
need for parents to be able to share citizenship with their children. In some
systems, it may be passed along without conditions for generations, regardless
of whether the parents have ever lived in the country of citizenship, but in the
United States, there are limits designed to ensure some level of ongoing and
meaningful affiliation with the United States.197 Lacking the physical connec-
tion inherent in jus soli citizenship, jus sanguinis citizenship uses the citizen
parent as a proxy for a different kind of connection; the extent of the citizen
parent’s connection to America will be, to some extent, scrutinized to be sure
that the proxy is a strong one.198 The requirements for establishing citizenship
through parentage have changed periodically, but the statutes generally reflect a
sense that parental citizenship without more—particularly significant periods of
residence—does not justify bequeathing citizenship generation after generation
without some renewal, from time to time, of their connection to America.199
Jus sanguinis citizenship—because of the generational limitations
imposed upon it—marks a less pure form of birthright citizenship than jus soli,
and in that way conceptually bridges the straightforwardness of strong jus soli
citizenship, where worthiness simply does not enter into the analysis, and natu-
ralization, where worthiness is much closer to being an explicit requirement.
Jus sanguinis shows the middle ground where Congress periodically struggles
to capture one piece of worthiness (connection to America) by recalibrating the
requirements for passing along citizenship to one’s children, but we also see
that once those requirements are met, no further inquiry need be made.200 Wor-
thiness is not part of the language or understanding of jus sanguinis citizenship.
erful and pragmatic bond between the government and the governed. Wong Kim Ark honors
that common law tradition.
196 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(d) (2012).
197 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012).
198 Matthew Lister has named the potential for over-inclusiveness when the parent’s ties to
the country of citizenship are not particularly strong. Discussing countries with the purest
form of jus sanguinis citizenship, he writes:
Strong jus sanguinis extends citizenship, or at least the right to access to citizenship as a matter
of right, to some who are not, and who need not be, members of the political community in
question. Any citizenship policy that distributes citizenship along ethnic lines will grant these
rights to some individuals who are not members of the political community.
Lister, supra note 194, at 200.
199 The statute’s requirements presently are gradated with fewer residence requirements
when both parents are citizens (or one is a citizen and one a national of the United States),
and more requirements where only one parent is a U.S. citizen; specifically, in one-parental
citizen situations, citizenship only passes to the child if that citizen parent was physically
present in the United States for at least five years, two of which being after the age of
fourteen. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g). For example, someone born in the United States to foreign-
born parents is a citizen. This citizen attended elementary school in America before going to
another country at age eleven. Subsequently, this citizen had a child with a non-American
partner. Because she or he had no residence in America beyond the age of fourteen, she or he
could not pass citizenship along to the child, because of a lack of connectedness to America,
as defined through INA § 301(g). Isabel Medina has developed a powerful critique of the
disparate impacts jus sanguinis citizenship has depending on the child’s race, or a parent’s
gender, marital status or sexual orientation, see Medina, supra note 88.
200 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(h).
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By contrast with the two systems of birthright citizenship, where worthi-
ness is either absent or muted, citizenship acquired through naturalization con-
tains many markers of worthiness. Where jus soli citizenship more effectively
captures actual, current connection to a country (with some problems of over-
inclusion for those who do not intend to maintain those connections), and jus
sanguinis citizenship more effectively captures cultural, ethnic, and family ties
to a country (with some problems of exclusion of those present for many years,
or dilution of ties through generational distance for those who emigrate), natu-
ralization reflects the conscious desire of a country to allow certain individuals
who meet all the desired characteristics to enter the polity later in life. In this
way, naturalization can be seen as an “earned” status,201 and this aspect encom-
passes the worthiness question created by the DREAMers’ quest.
Naturalization offers nation-states a means to experiment with require-
ments addressing the perceived faults in each of these two birthright citizenship
systems. With its constitutional authority to establish a “uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization,”202 Congress has undertaken such experimentation regularly since
the Naturalization Act of 1790, adjusting the qualities people must possess for
the transition from lawful permanent residence to citizenship. We see in the
history of these adjustments a steady narrowing of the understanding of who is
worthy of citizenship.
The racial dimensions of naturalization law over time were explicit for
many decades. As noted in Part II.D.1, the 1790 law itself limited naturaliza-
tion to “free white person[s],”203 and the Immigration Act of 1924 relied on
this law to exclude Asians who, as non-whites, were ineligible for citizen-
ship.204 Kevin Johnson, in his seminal 1998 article Race, the Immigration
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of
Darkness, paid particular attention to how Congress explicitly built race into
naturalization laws (and immigration laws more generally) as a means of
excluding those deemed undesirable.205 Although now implicit, the racial
dimensions of naturalization are still powerful. Among other factors, lawful
permanent residence is required for a period of either three206 or five207 years,
201
  Jennifer M. Chaco´n, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Irvine, Earning Citizenship,
Citizenship-in-Question Conference at Boston Law School, (Apr. 19–21, 2012) (forthcom-
ing 2013), available at http://jacquelinestevens.org/CitizenshipQuestionConfReptWAbs
tracts.pdf [hereinafter Chaco´n, Earning Citizenship].
202 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
203 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103.
204 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(d), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed
1952). Note that in the passage of the Act, race was an explicit concern. As one Senator
commented,
Thank God we have in America perhaps the largest percentage of any country in the world of the
pure, unadulterated Anglo-Saxon stock; certainly the greatest of any nation in the Nordic breed.
It is for the preservation of that splendid stock that has characterized us that I would make this
not an asylum for the oppressed of all countries . . . . Without offense, but with regard to the
salvation of our own, let us shut the door and assimilate what we have, and let us breed pure
American citizens and develop our own American resources.
65 CONG. REC. 5,961 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1924) (statement of Sen. Ellison Durant Smith).
205 Johnson, supra note 176, at 1113–15.
206 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2012).
207 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
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and, as detailed above, acquisition of lawful permanent residence itself remains
highly racialized.208 Knowledge of written and spoken English is also
required209 and, while fairly minimal, privileges those who, by education or by
opportunity, are better able to learn English. Poor immigrants—and class often
correlates with race for immigrants210—are the least likely to be able to spend
the time needed to learn English sufficiently well for purposes of
naturalization.211
Most significantly, naturalization also requires good moral character.212
This requirement closes the door to citizenship for immigrants with a wide
variety of criminal convictions, among others. This marks a dramatic departure
from the treatment of character requirements in the past. When this requirement
was first inserted into naturalization statutes, Congress sought to identify indi-
viduals whose “ ‘reputation which will pass muster with the average man [that]
need not rise above the level of the common mass of people.’ ”213 Adjudicators
thus had guidance permitting a finding of good moral character even where
applicants had blemished histories, and through the early and mid-20th century
they were also encouraged to apply principles of redemption and rehabilitation
to their findings.214 Such discretion, however, was sharply limited by the 1990
and 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which expanded
the universe of the “aggravated felonies” that precluded a finding of good
moral character.215 What discretion remained (for example, the ability to look
only at the most recent five years), is sharply constrained in practice by operat-
ing manuals permitting adjudicators to look at a much longer period of time.216
What remains is a sharply narrowed definition of good moral character
that is further narrowed by well-documented racial disparities in the criminal
justice system. Excellent legal and sociological scholarship and policy work
demonstrate how the criminal justice system affects people of color in a grossly
disproportionate way,217 demonstrating in turn how the good moral character
208 See supra Part II.D.2.
209 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1) (2012).
210 The Migration Policy Institutes regularly publishes reports on demographic data for dif-
ferent immigrant groups. A March 2013 report on Central American immigrants reflected a
23% poverty rate compared to 15% for native-born Americans. Sierra Stoney & Jeanne
Batalova, Central American Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar.
18, 2013), http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=938#17.
211 LUCY TSE, “WHY DON’T THEY LEARN ENGLISH?”: SEPARATING FACT FROM FALLACY IN
THE U.S. LANGUAGE DEBATE 25–29 (2001) (describing difficulties for adult learners with
long work weeks, although noting that overwhelmingly immigrants are learning English).
212 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
213 Ngai, Strange Career, supra note 80, at 105 (quoting Act of June 28, 1940 (54 Stat.
670) (alteration in original); see also Lapp, supra note 5, at 1586 (citing In re Spenser, 22 F.
Cas. 921 (C.C.D. Or. 1878)) (noting of the character requirement that “probably the average
man of the country is as high as it can be set”).
214 Lapp, supra note 5 at 1587–89.
215 Id. at 1590–91.
216 The character inquiry should extend to the applicant’s conduct during his or her entire
lifetime. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2) (2013). Lapp also points to other guidance from the
Field Manual encouraging the narrowest possible interpretation of good moral character.
Lapp, supra note 5, at 1607–08.
217 See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Cynthia Jones, Confronting Race in the Criminal Justice
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requirement has become a de facto racial barrier today. Immigrants have long
been misperceived as committing more crime than native-born individuals.218
Such misperceptions worsen when immigration status and race intersect
because people of color are vastly overrepresented in the criminal justice sys-
tem,219 and when immigrants are enmeshed in that system, they have fewer
procedural protections.220
E. The DREAMers’ New Face of Race and Citizenship
Compared with this complicated, highly racialized pipeline to naturaliza-
tion, the DREAM movement’s vision represents a profound shift. This is the
story of people of color, demanding citizenship for themselves by seeking the
permanent residence that is ultimately the sine qua non for their applications
for citizenship. Citizenship has been out of reach for DREAMers until now
simply because it would be impossible for them to qualify for the necessary
prior status of lawful permanent residence. Thus we have a situation where the
pipeline to citizenship is heavily influenced by race and has deprived them of
that necessary prior status, but where the DREAMers have been able to tran-
scend race to bypass the typical routes to permanent residence and demand that
status based upon their claims of membership and being American already. A
new narrative forced open a new path.
Moreover, the activists putting forward this legislation are the ones most
able to jump through the additional hoops required for naturalization, including
good moral character. Indeed, that emphasis on good character is part of the
System, 27 CRIM. JUST. 12 (2012); William Moffitt, Race and the Criminal Justice System,
36 GONZ. L. REV. 305 (2000).
218 See Stephen H. Legomsky, A New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 507 (2007) (“Despite clear evi-
dence that immigrants are generally less likely than the native-born to engage in criminal
behavior, public opinion polls historically, and today, reveal precisely the opposite percep-
tions. In poll after poll, the public perceives a positive correlation between immigration and
crime. Statements by public figures, especially politicians, often reinforce this perception.”);
Jayesh M. Rathod, Distilling Americans: The Legacy of Prohibition on U.S. Immigration
Law 2 (Sept. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Ted Brader
et al., Is It Immigration or the Immigrants? The Emotional Influence of Groups on Public
Opinion and Political Action 1 (Feb. 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
cess.nyu.edu/conferences/2-07-2008/Immigration_or_Immigrants.pdf (discussing how elite
discourse about illegal immigration focuses on the negative aspects of immigration such as
crime).
219 See generally COLE, supra note 217; Jones, supra note 217; Moffitt, supra note 217.
The Center for American Progress reports that “[w]hile people of color make up about 30%
of the United States’ population, they account for 60% of those imprisoned. . . . 1 in every 15
African American men and 1 in every 36 Hispanic men are incarcerated in comparison to 1
in every 106 white men.” Sophia Kerby, The Top 10 Most Startling Facts About People of
Color and Criminal Justice in the United States, CENTER FOR AMER. PROGRESS (Mar. 13,
2012) http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2012/03/13/11351/the-top-10
-most-startling-facts-about-people-of-color-and-criminal-justice-in-the-united-states/. The
same report cites the U.S. Sentencing Commission, noting that “in the federal system black
offenders receive sentences that are 10[%] longer than white offenders for the same crimes.”
Id.
220 Cade, supra note 77, at 1754 (enumerating the many ways in which trial courts fail to
protect the rights of those charged with misdemeanors).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-1\NVJ103.txt unknown Seq: 41 21-JAN-14 17:19
Fall 2013] DEFINING AMERICAN 141
basis for their appeal, with their narrative’s emphasis on being “law-abiding,”
and details from stories that typify what is popularly connoted by “good citi-
zenship”—excellence in school, civic engagement, and bright plans for contrib-
uting to society.221
Historically used as a means of limiting access to citizenship based on
race, naturalization is an important part of the vision being put forward by
DREAMers, and shows one way that American citizenship is expanding by
embracing people of color as worthy of the path to citizenship. Despite its fail-
ure to pass, as yet, momentum is on the side of the DREAM movement. The
Obama Administration’s 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals initia-
tive accomplished some of the DREAM Act’s objectives by means of an execu-
tive order, and largely mirrored the eligibility criteria long set forth by DREAM
Act legislation.222 The movement has also gained the support of such immigra-
tion critics as Bill O’Reilly223 and other Republicans previously opposed to the
Act.224 Most powerfully, current Congressional and Administrative plans, as
discussed above, put the situations of DREAM-eligible youth at the forefront of
immigration reform.
III. DANGERS OF WORTHINESS-BASED CITIZENSHIP
The worthiness narrative that makes the DREAM movement compelling
raises a challenging question: If worthiness is the way that these immigrants of
color are able to claim citizenship—if the politics demand that high burden—
does that open the door to denying citizenship to those deemed unworthy?
Beyond the political costs to immigrants’ broader hopes for expansive
reform of a system widely defined as “broken,” the DREAM movement has the
potential to tie in with strands of worthiness-based citizenship that already exist
in other dimensions of American political life. Such a re-examination of the
rights of those who already have citizenship may be a logical extension of any
vision of citizenship focused on worthiness. In her thought-provoking article
suggesting a vision of citizenship based upon connection (“jus nexi” citizen-
ship), Ayelet Shachar applies the New Property concept of ownership being
tied to whether someone is valuably using a property, providing a basis for
those who would use citizenship productively (like the DREAMers) to claim
that citizenship.225 But the nature of making such a determination necessarily
suggests an ability, or perhaps a duty, to determine who is not using their citi-
zenship productively.226 While Shachar focuses on connection, in contrast to
my focus on worthiness, the concern is comparable: pushing the limits of who
221 See supra Part I.B.
222
 Preston & Cushman, supra note 16; see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano,
supra note 179.
223 Interview by Bill O’Reilly with Jose Antonio Vargas, supra note 51.
224 Senator Marco Rubio, who voted against the DREAM Act in 2010, began putting for-
ward his own version of the law in 2012. Lizette Alvarez, With G.O.P.’s Ear, Rubio Pushes
Dream Act Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2012, at A13, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/us/politics/with-gops-ear-marco-rubio-pushes-dream-act-proposal
.html?_r=2&.
225 See Shachar, supra note 124, at 117.
226 Indeed, Shachar writes:
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is seen to be American can advantage many people significantly, but the act of
creating this flexibility itself puts others at risk.
The possible dangers of defining citizenship around a concept of worthi-
ness show up both within the context of immigration itself, and beyond the
sphere to perceptions of the rights of citizens who are considered less worthy,
or unworthy, of the exercise of their rights of citizenship—often people of
color. As explored below, there are ways in which a worthiness-based under-
standing of citizenship dovetails with arguments advanced by those who see
U.S. citizenship, as currently constituted, as being over-inclusive. Among the
variations on this theme are attacks on birthright citizenship, disenfranchise-
ment of felons, and attempts to make voter registration more difficult. Each of
these issues predominantly affects Americans of color.
A. The Cost of Worthiness to Immigration Reform
1. Comprehensive, but not Expansive, Immigration Reform
When television personality Bill O’Reilly debated Jose Antonio Vargas on
his show in June 2012, the two men agreed on at least one thing: for immigrant
youth who, like Vargas, came to America at a young age and embraced the idea
of American opportunity by achieving a high school diploma and seeking
higher education or pursuing military service, there should be a path toward
citizenship.227 O’Reilly also insisted, however, on a corollary point: for people
unlike Vargas, and the tens of thousands of young immigrants collectively
known as the DREAMers, there should be no such path.228 This article now
turns to the question of who is left out—who is seen as so “unlike” the
DREAMers as to not merit a path.
The division created inadvertently by the DREAM rhetoric occurs in a
number of ways. First is the movement’s emphasis on the DREAMers’ lack of
culpability for their own immigration situation—the blameless child is con-
trasted to the “wrong-doing” parent. For example, one DREAM supporter
wrote a letter to the Washington Post stating, “[t]here is no other example in
this country where a 5- or 10-year old would be prosecuted for committing a
crime in collusion with a parent or other adult.”229 This makes a nice argument
in favor of the DREAMer, but it certainly implies—if not explicitly states—
that the parent has acted criminally for bringing the child. Put more nimbly,
Steve Coll writes in the New Yorker, “The same reasoning that presumes inno-
When applying these [new property] understandings to citizenship, perhaps the most obvious
parallel is that immigration laws create precisely such a system of rules governing access to, and
control over, scarce resources—in this case, membership rights (and their accompanying bene-
fits) . . . . From the perspective of each member of the polity, re-conceptualizing his or her
entitlement to citizenship as a special kind of property fits well within the definition of new
property.
Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
227 Interview by Bill O’Reilly with Jose Antonio Vargas, supra note 51.
228 Id.
229 Zoe Amerigian, Letter to the Editor, ‘As American as Anyone’, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
2012, at A12, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-17/opinions/354924
47_1_young-immigrants-deferred-action-policy-legal-workforce.
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cent children also presumes guilty parents.”230 The discourse thus benefits one
part of the immigrant population in opposition to another—in this specific case,
the DREAMers’ own family members.231
In emphasizing that the DREAMers entered through no fault of their own,
the people who brought them here are thus implicitly differentiated and criti-
cized. This line-drawing extends back a generation to the Court in Plyler v.
Doe, which noted “those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in viola-
tion of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not
limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not compa-
rably situated.”232 Although helpful to establish sympathy for the children, this
line-drawing ignores the many ways in which the parents could have been oth-
erwise depicted, including as excellent parents seeking the best interests of their
children by coming to a country where they could provide for and support their
children—a narrative the DREAMers themselves are trying to advance—but
which is largely absent from political and popular discourse about immigration
reform.
A second source of differentiation comes from the DREAMers’ exper-
iences and hopes. DREAMers have completed, or are on track to complete,
high school educations. This is in contrast to those who immigrated as adults
without a chance for education (or even, in many cases, literacy). Partly this is
a function of economics where poorer immigrants work multiple jobs with
hours (and work conditions) that make it difficult to take the English classes
that are a necessary pre-condition for GED programs (and likewise make it
challenging to complete a GED program itself). Partly this is a function of age,
in two ways: older immigrants are more likely to be juggling work and family
responsibilities, impinging on time available for study, and may also struggle
more to learn English.233 The DREAM movement’s emphasis on the commit-
ment of youth to integrating into American culture by means of their studies is
therefore contrasted with those immigrants who, for any of a variety of reasons,
simply cannot match that accomplishment.234 Indeed, the Migration Policy
Institute has estimated that between 35% and 56% of the roughly 11 million
230 Steve Coll, Nation of Immigrants, NEW YORKER (July 2, 2012), http://www.newyorker
.com/talk/comment/2012/07/02/120702taco_talk_coll.
231 See Amerigian, supra note 229.
232 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
233 Age is among the factors affecting language-acquisition. See Jayesh M. Rathod, The
Transformative Potential of Attorney Bilingualism, 46 UNIV.  MICH. J.L. REFORM 863, 881
(2013) (citing Francois Grosjean, Studying Bilinguals: Methodological and Conceptual
Issues, 1 BILINGUALISM: LANGUAGE AND COGNITION 131, 132–33 (1998)).
234 Moreover, as other scholars have noted, adult immigrants, particularly from Mexico and
Central America, are seen as unworthy of investment in the same way that children are. As
Hiroshi Motomura writes, “For much of living memory, Latino immigrants—and Asian
immigrants before them—have been received not as Americans in waiting, but as merely
temporary, seasonal, or inexpensive laborers for fields and factories, often with the dispos-
ability that comes with being tolerated to be here unlawfully.” Motomura, Who Belongs?,
supra note 71, at 372.
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undocumented immigrants in the United States would be ineligible for immi-
gration relief that contained a requirement of being able to speak English.235
Another thread of the DREAM discourse that sets off many other immi-
grants is the emphasis on being “law abiding” individuals who entered the
country through no fault of their own. Media in the aftermath of the DACA
announcement emphasized this narrative thread.236 Politicians welcome the
ability to cast these individuals in the light of being “law-abiding” as well.237
The immediate contrast is to immigrants who came as adults, who can be seen
as knowingly and voluntarily breaking the law by entering or remaining with-
out permission. Clearly, however, those who suffer even more by direct com-
parison are immigrants with a broad range of criminal convictions. As
successive amendments to the INA show, policy-makers are steadily expanding
the kinds of crimes that make immigrants unfit for presence, let alone citizen-
ship, in the United States, and although this expansion has been rued and criti-
cized (with a few voices wondering whether there is still a place for mercy in
our treatment of immigrants238), the DREAMers inadvertently validate the
trend by distancing themselves from immigrants with criminal convictions who
would be “unworthy” of the relief being offered.
We can begin, then, to name the people who are left out for having stories
too different from those of the DREAMers. The construction worker with no
criminal convictions who came to the United States at age twenty, or the grand-
mother who came illegally in 1990 to care for her grandbabies while their
mother finished vocational school—both individuals old enough to be held
accountable for their decisions to illegally enter the country—are culpable in a
way that a DREAMer is not, and are less worthy of the path. Under the current
Senate proposal, such individuals would be placed on the slower track, the one
235 Marc R. Rosenblum et al., Earned Legalization: Effects of Proposed Requirements on
Unauthorized Men, Women and Children, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 8 (Jan. 2011), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/legalization-requirements.pdf.
236 The lede of the Christian Science Monitor’s article on the initiative was typical, empha-
sizing both the DREAMers’ own lack of culpability and the passive, invisible culpability of
those who brought them here illegally: “Ever since President Obama announced in June that
he was halting deportations of otherwise law-abiding young immigrants brought to the US
illegally, the immigrants (and restive members of Congress) have been eager to learn how
the program would work.” David Grant, Obama’s ‘DREAM Act’: How it will work is still a
work in progress, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com
/USA/Politics/2012/0807/Obama-s-DREAM-Act-How-it-will-work-is-still-a-work-in-pro
gress (emphasis added). An editorial for the Albany Times Union picked up similar lan-
guage: “Congress should adopt the Dream Act, so young people here illegally through no
fault of their own can stay and either serve or attain a college degree.”  Editorial, Well, Are
We There Yet?, ALB. TIMES UNION, Jan. 31, 2013, at A12 (emphasis added), available at
http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Editorial-Well-are-we-there-yet-4237574.php.
237 Considering the path created for DREAMers in 2013 immigration reform proposals,
Rep. Jim Cooper of Tennessee noted, “I voted for the DREAM Act in 2010 because I believe
that law-abiding students and those willing to serve in our military, who came to this country
through no fault of their own, should be encouraged to pursue the American dream of citi-
zenship.” Paul C. Barton, Tennessee Lawmakers Cautious About Path to Citizenship, WBIR
.COM (Feb. 1, 2013, 8:28 PM), http://www.wbir.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=252269
(emphasis added).
238 Bill Ong Hing, Detention to Deportation—Rethinking the Removal of Cambodian Refu-
gees, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 891, 956 (2005).
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requiring the consent of border state commissions before gaining anything but
probationary status.239 Likewise, the woman with two old theft convictions
who has been working as a teacher’s aide in a daycare for twenty years would
be left out because of her criminal history, as would the refugee and torture
survivor who turned to controlled substance abuse as a means of coping with
untreated trauma, or the day laborer with three DUIs who has been sober for a
decade or more. Even though the DREAM movement has recently made efforts
to include more of these stories, and emphasized that their parents were the
original “dreamers,” the reforms being debated in 2013 have tracked the
implicit divide that has been part of the movement since its beginnings.
Indeed, while the proposed reforms are labeled “comprehensive” immigra-
tion reform, they are far from being expansive immigration reform. Both the
President’s proposal and the Senate blueprint distinguish among the people
worthy and unworthy of reform, either blocking some people from the path to
citizenship entirely, or providing a less desirable process for others. Immigrants
with criminal convictions are particularly disadvantaged under the Senate
blueprint, which denies any path for immigrants with criminal convictions
(without specifying whether severity matters or if convictions from the distant
past would be considered differently, a notion that used to be critically impor-
tant in immigration law).240 Although his plan promises to undo some of the
excesses of the 1996 conflation of criminal convictions with immigration con-
sequences, President Obama still likewise distinguished quickly, in his remarks
on reform, between those who only broke the law to come (or stay) without
permission, and those outside the “overwhelming majority of these individuals
[who] aren’t looking for any trouble.”241 By inference, those who were looking
for trouble—those with criminal convictions, presumably—are problematic.
Later in his remarks, he contrasted the worthy “contributing members of the
community” who are “looking out for their families” and who are “woven into
the fabric of our lives,” with those “who are here illegally and who endanger
our communities. And today, deportation of criminals [are] at [their] highest
level ever,” a line that met with applause.242
Both proposals also distinguish between the DREAMers and almost every
other undocumented immigrant, creating an inferior process for the latter. The
Obama proposal sets up a series of measures that sound punitive in nature—
holding immigrants accountable for the initial law-breaking of entering (or
remaining) without permission, “a process that includes passing a background
check, paying taxes, paying a penalty, learning English, and then going to the
back of the line, behind all the folks who are trying to come here legally. That’s
only fair, right?”243 The Senate Blueprint likewise demands that not a single
239 Senate Blueprint, supra note 20.
240 Id.
241 Obama Remarks Jan. 29, 2013, supra note 7.
242 Id. The extent to which the deportation of criminals reflects stated Administration priori-
ties for deporting dangerous criminals is disputed. See, e.g., Corey Dade, Obama Adminis-
tration Deported Record 1.5 Million People, NPR (Dec. 24, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.npr
.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/24/167970002/obama-administration-deported-record-1-5-
million-people.
243 Obama Remarks Jan. 29, 2013, supra note 7.
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individual will move off probationary status until all those currently in the pipe-
line for permanent residence have their green cards.244 As noted in Part I.A,
such a process consigns immigrants to years or decades before regularizing
their status, compared to the almost instant granting of lawful permanent resi-
dence should the DREAM Act pass.
DREAM Act legislation would surely help a deserving constituency, but it
would not address the larger concerns of a broken immigration system. The
DREAM Act would not represent comprehensive immigration reform which
deals in a meaningful way with our nation’s undocumented population. That is
because vast swaths of undocumented persons would be excluded because they
do not hold the same level of blamelessness (this, ironically includes the par-
ents of many DREAMers) or the same level of worthiness (a point which is
increasingly problematic due to the substantial expansion of criminal convic-
tions with immigration consequences) as the DREAMers.
2. The Limits of the DREAMer Coattails
There is at least a theoretical possibility that coming to terms with one
group’s “illegality” opens the public’s minds to accepting other groups into the
polity as well: a positive policy feedback loop. Without making a complete
response to this view, which has been ably put forward by Michael A. Olivas in
his scholarship,245 this article contends that such a hope is implausible for three
distinct reasons. First, the political energy generated by and for the DREAMers
is likely to dissipate once they achieve their goal of membership. Second, posi-
tive policy feedbacks are notoriously difficult to create. Last, DREAMers ini-
tially defined themselves so narrowly that they are easier to classify as sui
generis.
First, DREAMers’ coattails are likely limited because the movement is
unlikely to continue with the same force after its goals are realized. The formal
divide between them and the American polity they feel part of provides fire for
their efforts, but once the divide subsists, the organizing fire may likewise
diminish, as has happened with other movements in American history. Noted
political scientist Theda Skocpol analyzes a comparable dynamic with the
women’s suffrage movement. Women’s sharply delineated exclusion from the
polity explains the intensity of organizing efforts that went into women’s suf-
frage, but Skocpol contrasts that with what happened next:
After formal inclusion . . . most members of the category may move toward accom-
modation with standard political routines. How soon this happens depends on the
degree to which the group retains its own self-consciousness and organization after
being granted access to the electorate. For the most part, American women failed to
244 Senate Blueprint, supra note 20.
245 Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act, supra note 1, at 1757. Olivas builds
on the work of political scientists Benjamin Marquez and John Witte, who see piecemeal
legislation as an effective way of advancing through politically difficult reform of complex
systems. Id. at 1789–90. While expressing optimism that the DREAM Act could have
moved immigration reform forward as a whole, he acknowledges the reasons for which
immigration may simply be different: “basics of the system are so complex, the policy issues
are so politicized and so intertwined, and the different coalitions are so evanescent that the
polity cannot feed all the smaller parts through the legislative scheme and process one com-
ponent at a time.” Id. at 1806–07.
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do this after they began to participate fully in elections and regular party and bureau-
cratic politics in the 1920s.246
Second, positive policy feedback loops—where a policy changes public
opinion—are notoriously difficult to achieve. The welfare reform effort of
1996 is illustrative here, as one reason given by some progressives for
accepting certain aspects of the law that were unpalatable was the hope that
agreeing to those reforms would create a new political space to perceive the
poor differently; as Democratic Leadership Council president Al From said in
2000, “Who’s running against welfare now? . . . Who’s running against poor
people? . . . By taking [crime and welfare] away as political issues, we did a lot
of good for minorities and low-income communities.”247 Welfare reform would
thus “create a political climate more favorable to the needy. Once taxpayers
started viewing the poor as workers, not welfare cheats, a more generous era
would ensue. . . . New benefits would flow.”248 This view, however, proved
overly optimistic and public opinion did not shift as desired,249 and no signifi-
cant revision to federal welfare laws has been made in the intervening years.
Third, the DREAMers initially defined themselves so specifically and in
such a favorable light that they are likely sui generis and may not be able to
bring in other groups on their coattails if those groups are seen as less worthy.
The DREAMers began attempting to broaden the discourse and create those
powerful coattails by the end of 2012, but as argued in Section I, the rhetorical
broadening did not manifest in any of the legislative proposals put forward, all
of which treated the DREAMers as sui generis. Worthiness-framed member-
ship questions necessarily permit an ongoing framing of membership questions
in terms of worthiness and unworthiness—a discourse that bodes poorly for
broader immigration reform. As Skocpol has written, “[i]nstitutional and cul-
tural oppositions between the morally ‘deserving’ and the less deserving run
like fault lines through the entire history of American social provision.”250 The
earliest origins of welfare programs show this fault line (deserving U.S. civil
war veterans against those who did not fight, or who fought in the Confederacy;
worthy widowed mothers but not unworthy single mothers). The line persists
through modern-day reforms since 1996, which also centered on defining and
246 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 52–53 (1992) (emphasis added).
247 Jason DeParle & Steven A. Holmes, A War on Poverty Subtly Linked to Race, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/26/politics
/26CLIN.html?.
248 Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, A Public Transformed? Welfare Reform as Policy Feed-
back, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111, 113 (2007) (citing DeParle & Holmes, supra note 247).
249 Id. at 120 (“[W]e find no evidence for the major outcomes sought by progressive revi-
sionists. . . . With ‘welfare’ off the agenda, Americans did not become more willing to spend
on the poor, on blacks, or on welfare, and public opposition to reducing inequality and
raising living standards for the poor actually increased.”).
250 SKOCPOL, supra note 246, at 149. In answering the question of why early Civil War
veteran pension schemes did not lead to a European-style welfare state in the United States,
Skocpol notes that, among other factors, the initial categorizations between worthy (veterans,
no matter their class or race) and unworthy (southerners, no matter their poverty level or
race) mitigated against the expansion of welfare programs as a matter of broader, basic
government responsibility. Skocpol contrasts the benefits made increasingly available to
Civil War veterans with the reluctance to provide resources to “paupers.” Id. at 150.
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redefining who was “deserving” of receiving benefits. Indeed, the 1996
reforms—by tightening restrictions and trying to destroy the possibility for
“welfare queens,” whose demonization led to so much popular and political
vilification of the welfare system—hoped to build a fresh base of support for
welfare itself, a goal that has, to say the least, gone unfulfilled.251 Such a his-
tory should give pause to those who hope that showing the worthiness of some
in the field of immigration reform can lead to an expansion of policies for the
many.
The same fault line runs through immigration law itself, from the early
20th century through the proposals of today. Ngai, in his scholarship on the
deportation efforts intensifying after the 1924 Act, imagined “deserving and
underserving illegal immigrants and, concomitantly, just and unjust deporta-
tions.”252 Likewise legislation in the 1930s followed along two tracks: one
track providing harsh treatment for immigrants with criminal convictions, and
another for “exceptionally meritorious” cases involving separation of families,
with one track providing political cover for the latter.253 The 1986 passage of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act tracked these two stories as well,
between worthy and unworthy immigrants.254 Indeed, we need not prognosti-
cate about whether an impulse to segregate the “worthy” DREAMers from
others exists; we are already beginning to see the divisions between proposals
aiming at providing DREAMers citizenship when others would need to wait—
or not be placed on the path at all.255
B. Effects on Calls to Restrict the 14th Amendment
A second aspect of the worthiness-based framing of citizenship emerges in
political debates surrounding the contours and edges of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Where the DREAMers highlight a problem of citizenship’s under-inclu-
siveness and demand a path to inclusion, critics point to jus soli citizenship as
being overly inclusive. The “over-inclusion” problem, simply stated, is that jus
soli citizenship imperfectly fits prized attributes of what “being American”
means. People without ties to America become equal, under this operation of
law, to those with significant ties.256 Critics like Peter Brimelow, Georgie
Geyer, and Rush Limbaugh have over-stated and manipulated this concern,
251 See, e.g., Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune, New Lyrics?, 11
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 389, 389, 397–99 (2004).
252 NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 19, at 57.
253 Id. at 81.
254 LINA NEWTON, ILLEGAL, ALIEN OR IMMIGRANT: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
168 (2008).
255 Peter Wallsten & Rosalind S. Helderman, Citizenship Question Roils Both Parties as
Immigration Debate Gets Under Way, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/politics/citizenship-question-roils-both-parties-as-immigration-debate-gets-under
way/2013/01/31/0588b44a-6b97-11e2-bd36-c0fe61a205f6_story.html?hpid=z2.
256 Jennifer Chaco´n is presently exploring with great thoughtfulness how politicians and the
public consider different forms of citizenship to be more and less “earned,” even when the
law treats citizens equally, as is the case with the Fourteenth Amendment. Chaco´n, Earning
Citizenship, supra note 201.
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often in entirely unmasked racial language, but with enough effectiveness to
keep their concerns part of multiple policy debates.257
Jus soli citizenship, with the perceived danger it brings of over-inclusion,
has been criticized in different contexts. Peter H. Schuck has strongly critiqued
it in consideration of the case of American citizen, and accused terrorist, Anwar
Al-Awlaki.258 Al-Awlaki received citizenship based upon being born in the
United States to parents who lived here while Al-Awlaki’s father was studying
and working. Al-Awlaki returned to Yemen at age 7, and never returned to the
United States.259 He joined Al-Qaeda and became a leader, with alleged involv-
ment in the Christmas Day airline plot, among others.260 After he was killed in
a targeted drone strike, and his U.S. citizen son killed in a separate strike two
weeks later, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit asserting that,
as a U.S. citizen, he was deprived of life without due process of law.261 This
argument relies upon the clarity of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is not
subject to considerations of worthiness and affiliation. The Administration
seemed to be convinced that Al-Awlaki’s status as “merely” a citizen by birth
tempered constitutional concerns, a view that came out in two ways. First, con-
cerning the death of the son, Administration spokesperson Robert Gibbs mini-
mized the death: as Atlantic reporter Conor Fridersdorf writes, “Gibbs
nevertheless defends the strike, not by arguing that the kid was a threat, or that
killing him was an accident, but by saying that his late father irresponsibly
joined al Qaeda terrorists. Killing an American citizen without due process on
that logic ought to be grounds for impeachment.”262 Here we see rhetoric that
the unworthiness of the father is so potent that it extends to and diminishes the
U.S. citizen son; the son is unworthy by association with the father, and his
unworthiness becomes the justification for the denial of due process. Second,
and more recently, the white paper issued by the administration summarizing
the legal justification for targeted killings of U.S. citizens reflects this entry of a
worthiness framework—in a most dramatic fashion—into constitutional rights.
As ACLU Legal Director Jameel Jaffer summarized, “[t]he paper’s basic con-
tention is that the government has the authority to carry out the extrajudicial
killing of an American citizen if ‘an informed, high-level official’ deems him to
257 See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Rush Limbaugh with caller (Apr. 2, 2013), available
at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2013/04/02/caller_asks_why_nobody_s_stopping_an
chor_babies.
258 Peter H. Schuck, Can We Revoke Faisal Shahzad’s Citizenship?, WALL ST. J., May 14,
2010, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB200014240527487042501045752
38754192957856.html (outlining legal arguments for stripping members of Al-Qaeda of
their citizenship).
259 U.S. Officials Warn of Possible Retaliation After al Qaeda Cleric Is Killed, CNN (Sept.
30, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/30/world/africa/yemen-radical-cleric
/index.html.
260 Josh Meyer, Terrorism Investigation Widens: U.S-Born Cleric Linked to Airline Bomb-
ing Plot, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2009, at 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec
/31/nation/la-na-terror-intel31-2009dec31.
261 Complaint at 2, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/tk_complaint_to_file.pdf.
262 Conor Friedersdorf, How Team Obama Justifies the Killing of a 16-Year-Old American,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:02 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10
/how-team-obama-justifies-the-killing-of-a-16-year-old-american/264028/.
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present a ‘continuing’ threat to the country.”263 The paper thus tempers the
Fourteenth Amendment’s absolute equality with compelling, but inherently
subjective, factors about who is worthy of citizenship’s protections.
Away from the glare of terrorism, the summer of 2011 saw another con-
troversy reflecting a level of popular discontent with birthright citizenship for
those deemed unworthy of it. Over that summer, media embraced the term
“anchor baby,” bestowed upon children born to undocumented immigrants,
particularly Mexican immigrants.264 This slang, as offensive265 as it is devoid
of legal meaning, captures the factually contested266 idea that immigrants have
children in the United States specifically so that the parents might derive citi-
zenship through the baby—something that, even if true, would only be possible
once the child turns twenty-one.267 Nonetheless, the rhetoric spawned Congres-
sional efforts to amend the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent such a manner of
citizenship-acquisition.268
The “anchor baby” debate showed how strands of worthiness analysis
have crept into political discourse. Those sensationalizing the issue saw a
cheapening of the value of citizenship in the image of a nine-months pregnant
mother coming to the U.S. only so that her child would gain jus soli citizenship
(regardless of the paucity of reliable data underlying that image).269 To these
263 Jameel Jaffer, The Justice Department’s White Paper on Targeted Killing, ACLU (Feb.
4, 2013, 10:04 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/justice-departments-white
-paper-targeted-killing.
264 Symptomatic of its explosion was the use of “anchor baby” to discuss the child of Oscar
winning actor and actress Javier Bardem and Penelope Cruz, two individuals who surely had
other more promising means to achieve legal immigration status in the United States. Jorge
Rivas, Fox News: “Pene´lope Cruz is Having an Anchor Baby”, COLORLINES (Dec. 14, 2010,
11:36 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2010/12/fox_news_penelope_cruz_is_having_an
_anchor_baby.html.
265 American Heritage Dictionary, which had originally included the term simply as “slang”
added the term “offensive” to the definition after receiving complaints. Mary Giovagnoli,
American Heritage Dictionary Redefines “Anchor Baby” as “Offensive” and “Disparag-
ing”, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2011, 6:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary
-giovagnoli/anchor-baby-definition_b_1132196.html. The revision met with its own attack
from those who felt the dictionary had capitulated to political correctness. Bob Dane, Dic-
tionary’s “Anchor Baby” Decision Is Definition of Foolish, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/12/09/dictionarys-anchor-baby-decision-is-defini
tion-foolish/.
266 PolitiFact analyzes the complexity of figuring out precise numbers. Fact-Checking the
Claims About ‘Anchor Babies’ and Whether Illegal Immigrants ‘Drop and Leave’, POLI-
TIFACT.COM (Aug. 6, 2010, 6:15 PM), www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010
/aug/06/lindsey-graham/illegal-immigrants-anchor-babies-birthright/. But the debate was
never about the actual problem, but more the idea of the problem. See Ted Brader et al.,
What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration
Threat, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 959, 959–60 (2008).
267 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
268 Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. (2011); Birthright Citizenship
Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (2011); Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868,
111th Cong. (2009); see also Marc Lacey, On Immigration, Birthright Fight in U.S. Is
Looming, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5. 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01
/05/us/politics/05babies.html?pagewanted=all.
269 For an example of the imprecise mixture of anecdotes and statistics, see Steve Sailer,
“Birthright Citizenship”: (A.K.A. Jus Soli) and the Cheating of America, VDARE.COM
(Aug. 22, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.vdare.com/articles/birthright-citizenship-aka-jus-soli
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critics, bestowing something of such value on those whose ties may be
extremely limited was “offensive.”270 Schuck suggested conditioning the grant-
ing of citizenship on “genuine connection” to the United States (a term that
summons the expectations of DREAMers), and suggests measuring that con-
nection by time spent in the American educational system.271 Those responding
to attempts to limit jus soli citizenship point to the ways in which jus soli
citizenship has prevented the creation of a race-based group of “second class
citizens”272 and point to more troubling sources of devaluation of citizenship,
including the American educational system itself.273
How does the DREAM movement affect such controversies? Some of
those championing the DREAMers are also those protesting, vociferously, the
rise in terminology such as “anchor babies.”274 Clearly, sympathy for one part
of the immigration reform movement has not led to the abandonment of others.
Nonetheless, the worthiness framework used to justify extending a path to citi-
zenship for DREAMers softens the lines around citizenship potentially to the
disadvantage of those who are less worthy and who have not “earned” their
citizenship.275 Shifting to a more malleable view of citizenship makes excellent
sense where we see the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment in capturing
the membership of these worthy youth: an answer to the problem of under-
inclusiveness. What can be used for under-inclusiveness, however, can also be
used to consider over-inclusiveness. If citizenship becomes more malleable in
this way, the next logical step is a reassessment of the worthiness of those who
already possess citizenship to maintain it. The controversies surrounding Amer-
-and-the-cheating-of-america (sharing an anecdote of a Chinese woman intending to come to
the U.S. while nine months pregnant specifically to give her child U.S. citizenship, and
immediately stating that births to undocumented parents constitute 8% of all births in the
U.S., clearly—but wrongly—implying that those births are all to last-minute border-
crossers).
270 Peter H. Schuck, Birthright of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at A19, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/opinion/14schuck.html (citing to the narrative about
“anchor babies” of women who cross the border simply to have a child who will benefit
from U.S. citizenship). Similarly jus soli systems in Europe have been criticized where, with
the exception of Germany, states have been moving toward restricting jus soli citizenship.
See Mancini & Finlay, supra note 194, at 576. The situation also spawned less scholarly
calls for revisiting the Fourteenth Amendment. Typical of these is Sailer, supra note 269
(commenting on “a sophisticated policy issue deeply affecting America’s future. In this case,
it’s cheaters misappropriating the legal privileges of being an American.”).
271 Schuck, supra note 270.
272 Matt Lister, Should the U.S. Maintain Its Strong Jus Soli Rule?, FACULTY LOUNGE (July
8, 2010, 4:21 pm), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2010/07/should-the-us-maintain-its-
strong-jus-soli-rule.html (“It is my belief that, without the strong jus soli principle we have
in the U.S., immigrants from “non-white” countries would have been forced into a perma-
nently 2nd-class non-citizen status.”).
273 Luis F.B. Plascencia powerfully examines how the cause for concern about the devalua-
tion of citizenship through immigration is both overstated and misplaced. PLASCENCIA, supra
note 79, at 51–83.
274 For example, the Immigration Policy Center has championed immigration reform
broadly, and the DREAMers specifically, and its Director, Mary Giovagnoli, led the charge
against the American Heritage Dictionary’s adoption of the term “anchor baby” in December
2011. Giovagnoli, supra note 265.
275 Chaco´n, Earning Citizenship, supra note 201.
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ican-born terror suspects and the American-born children of undocumented
parents demonstrate that those reassessments are already happening.
C. Outside of Immigration: Unworthy Americans
Beyond the questions surrounding citizenship acquisition, worthiness dis-
course also infuses consideration of who maintains the rights and benefits of
citizenship. As a theoretical matter, the question of what it should take to main-
tain citizenship has already been suggested by Eric Liu, writing for The
Atlantic:
What is jesting is any expectation that we would in fact enact [an agenda of making
citizenship revocable and renewable every ten years only by merit]. But the jest is
meant to make plain that some of the people now called “citizens” are far less worthy
of citizenship in this civic republican sense than some of the people now called
“undocumented” or “illegal” or “anchor babies.”276
Liu’s essay actually creates a provocative defense of the American aspira-
tions of undocumented immigrants, but his rhetorical exercise also fits uncom-
fortably well within two real debates happening currently far beyond the field
of immigration itself: voter identification laws and felon disenfranchisement.
Voter identification laws are often justified, at least in part, by the argu-
ment that voting is a privilege277 and that those who cannot undertake the nec-
essary steps to vote by getting valid identification documents are not worthy of
the privilege.278 As one Pennsylvania legislator commented, “ ‘[w]e have a lot
of people out there that are too lazy to . . . get up and get out there and get the
ID they need.’ ”279 When the court ruled against implementation of the law, the
same legislator again denounced the laziness of those who lacked IDs, and
added “ ‘Justice Simpson and the Corbett administration have chosen to openly
enable and fully embrace the ever-increasing entitlement mentality of those
individuals who have no problem living off the fruits of their neighbors’ labor.’
”
280
 Such rhetoric suggests that the disenfranchisement of those without identi-
fication need not trouble us because they are not worthy of it. This connection
between unworthiness and laziness emerged in welfare reform discussions,
276 Eric Liu, Should All Americans Have to Earn Their Citizenship?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2,
2012, 12:16 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/02/should-all-ameri
cans-have-to-earn-their-citizenship/252433/.
277 For a discussion of the fallacy of voting as a privilege, see Garrett Epps, Voting: Right
or Privilege?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national
/archive/2012/09/voting-right-or-privilege/262511/.
278 See, e.g., Ron Christie, Opinion: Voting in America is a Privilege, Not a Right, WNYC
(Mar. 20, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/its-free-blog/2012/mar/20/opinion
-voting-america-privilege-not-right/. Critics contend vociferously that the intent is far less
benign (to disenfranchise the poor, and communities of color which are least likely to pos-
sess the required documentation), and that in any event, voting is a right, not a privilege. See
Epps, supra note 277.
279 Pam Fessler, Pa. Voters Battle Bureaucracy Ahead of ID Law Ruling, NPR (Sept. 27,
2012, 3:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/27/161826027/pa-voters-battle-bureaucracy
-ahead-of-id-law-ruling (quoting State Representative Daryl Metcalfe).
280 Brentin Mock, Pennsylvania GOP Leader Insists Voter ID Opposition Is About ‘Lazy’
Voters, COLORLINES (Oct. 3, 2012, 10:18 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/10/pa_re
publicans_think_youre_too_lazy_to_vote_after_voter_id_ruling.html.
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reflecting fears about poor people and people of color.281 As Peter Edelman has
noted, “Americans had always distinguished between ‘deserving’ and ‘unde-
serving’ poor people, and people of color were typically regarded as ‘undeserv-
ing.’ ”282 Such divisions are part of a long-standing narrative that seeks to
justify racism and exclusion on more rhetorically palatable grounds.283
The second major debate relevant to maintaining citizenship rights arises
in the context of felon disenfranchisement and particularly affects the citizen-
ship rights of people of color. Many states have enacted laws variously forbid-
ding felons from voting while incarcerated or from voting at any time
thereafter—even when sentences are fully served.284 As Jamin Raskin has
argued, such laws serve no punitive or deterrent purpose, but are a “strategy of
mass electoral suppression.”285 It is, moreover, a mass suppression that dispro-
portionately targets citizens of color, who are disproportionately likely to have
the kind of criminal record that would result in disenfranchisement.286 Many
scholars have noted how people of color endure disparities at every stage from
281 As one commentator said at a Virginia roundtable discussion of welfare reform:
There’s clearly always been a concept in this country, and it’s still here today, about the ‘deserv-
ing poor.’ We’re willing to give public tax money to people we think deserve it. But if we think
somebody is conning the system or scamming or not doing their share, then we’re not willing to
do that. . . . And it has a heavy race connotation. It always has.
Commentary, Hampton Roads Roundtable; What to Do About Welfare, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Oct. 29, 1995, at J1 (remarks of Howard Cullum).
282 Edelman, supra note 251, at 390 (citation omitted). The disproportionate impact of voter
identification laws upon communities of color has been well documented, and formed the
basis for the series of courtroom defeats of voter identification laws in multiple states in
2012. See generally Segregating American Citizenship, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Sept. 24,
2012), http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/691d4ca5f1fb88ac7f_gum6yz1ie.pdf.
283 See SKOCPOL, supra note 246, at 138. That voter identification laws disparately impact
communities of color is widely accepted (although the extent to which that impact is inten-
tional is fiercely contested). Courts struck down many of these proposed laws, noting in each
case their likely disparate racial impact. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 138 (D.D.C.
2012).
[R]ecord evidence suggests that SB 14, if implemented, would in fact have a retrogressive effect
on Hispanic and African American voters. This conclusion flows from three basic facts: (1) a
substantial subgroup of Texas voters, many of whom are African American or Hispanic, lack
photo ID; (2) the burdens associated with obtaining ID will weigh most heavily on the poor; and
(3) racial minorities in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty. Accordingly, SB 14
will likely “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effec-
tive exercise of the electoral franchise.”
Id.
284 Virginia, Kentucky, Florida, and Iowa extend disenfranchisement past the time that the
individual has served his or her prison sentence. About Felon Disenfranchisement, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION VA., https://acluva.org/restore-our-vote2/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
285 Jamin Raskin, Lawful Disenfranchisement: America’s Structural Democracy Deficit, 32
HUM. RTS. 12, 12, 15 (2005) (examining the “democracy deficit” created by felon disen-
franchisement, ballot validation problems, and other measures that disproportionately impact
African-American and Hispanic voters).
286 A 2012 report estimates that 5.85 million people were disenfranchised as a result of a
criminal conviction, with African-Americans disenfranchised at a rate four times great than
non-African-Americans (7.7% compared with 1.8%). Christopher Uggen et al., State-Level
Estimates of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 2010, THE SENTENCING PRO-
JECT 1–2 (July 2012), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_State_Level_Esti
mates_of_Felon_Disen_2010.pdf.
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arrest to pleading to convictions to sentencing.287 The results of disenfranchise-
ment laws thus have a strongly disparate impact upon people of color.
In this civil rights debate, citizenship and worthiness again collide dramat-
ically, as those with criminal convictions are deemed permanently unworthy of
the most fundamental right of citizenship: the right to vote. Such rhetoric dates
to the arguable creation of a constitutional basis for felony disenfranchisement,
the post-Civil War amendments that extended the franchise to African-Ameri-
cans.288 Richard Re has illuminated this history, which he deems an “irony,”
noting that the extension of the franchise relied upon a political philosophy
favoring the actions of people over status-based classifications of people.
Someone’s race, in this view, was not determinative of citizenship-worthiness,
but someone’s actions could be.289 When then-Governor George Allen
defended Virginia’s felon disenfranchisement law, he noted that the right to
vote could be restored if someone’s actions proved their worthiness:
[t]he things most Governors would look at, regardless of party, are what kind of life
has the ex-felon led since serving their time? I would consider whether or not they
were involved in wholesome community-based activities, or just leading the life of a
law-abiding citizen and not committing any crimes.290
Given the plethora of well-documented barriers affecting ex-felons’ ability
to find employment or housing, demonstrating this kind of worthiness may be
exceedingly difficult. Someone who cannot find steady employment because of
287 See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 349–52 (2012); Marc Mauer, Race,
Class, and the Development of Criminal Justice Policy, 21 REV. POL’Y RES. 79, 79, 84
(2004); Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the Black Vote:
The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1994).
288 I use the word “arguable” because the constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement is
not explicit, but rather inferred from the exception written into § 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, noting that states would not have congressional representation reapportioned for those
numbers lost to felon disenfranchisement. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55
(1974); see generally Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Dis-
enfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1589–90 (2012)
(“[A]ll three Reconstruction Amendments, as well as . . . important Reconstruction-era stat-
utes, were motivated and shaped by what this Article calls ‘the irony of egalitarian disen-
franchisement’—that is, the tendency of radical egalitarians in the Reconstruction era to
justify the enfranchisement of black Americans by simultaneously defending the disen-
franchisement of criminals.”).
289 Re quotes legislative history from the Reconstruction Amendments, particularly the
remarks of Representative Loughridge:
[I]f a man be of white blood, though he may be destitute of talent, intelligence, patriotism, or
virtue . . . all the privileges of the governing class are freely accorded to him . . . . But if a man
unfortunately be of African descent . . . although he may have an intellect of the highest order, a
cultivated mind, and a character unsullied by vice . . . , yet notwithstanding all this he is ruth-
lessly and cruelly thrust down and consigned, without question and without reason, to hopeless
degradation.
Re & Re, supra note 288, at 1594 (quoting Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 200
(Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep. William Loughridge)). As Re notes, “Representative
Loughridge not only praised the ‘virtue’ of black Americans, but also condemned the ‘vice’
of many immoral whites. In arguing so insistently that the former did not deserve ‘hopeless
degradation,’ Loughridge insinuated that the latter might.” Id. at 1596 (citations omitted).
290 JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 82 (2006).
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his criminal record, for example, may be cobbling together odd jobs with diffi-
cult hours that make involvement in “wholesome community-based activities”
impossible.291 Just as the DREAMers set a standard of worthiness which many
other immigrants, for reasons from age to education to opportunity, cannot eas-
ily meet, here, too, ex-felons are being asked to demonstrate worthiness of their
right to vote in ways that are too often out of reach.292
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to name the dangers in introducing notions of
worthiness into our understanding of citizenship. While recognizing the enor-
mous normative appeal of the DREAMer narrative, and acknowledging its
undeniable political effectiveness, the article has shown how claims to citizen-
ship based upon worthiness carry costs and dangers. Some of these costs have
emerged in the realm of immigration law in 2013 as legislators take a bifur-
cated approach to immigration reform, creating one fast process for the worthi-
est, the DREAMers, another much more time-consuming and complex system
for the less worthy, and entirely excluding the unworthy (those who cannot
speak English, who lack the money to pay fines and filing fees, or who possess
even minor criminal convictions). Other dangers are less immediate, but no less
troublesome: using standards of worthiness to undo or limit the open clarity of
our jus soli citizenship law that has been a laudable exception to the overall
history of excluding people from citizenship by race. And in its most extreme
form, there is danger in becoming comfortable with the idea of using worthi-
ness to justify bestowing citizenship on some, when that means we also
become comfortable with taking citizenship away as people prove unworthy for
it. Current law does permit denaturalization, although instances of denaturaliza-
tion are extremely rare. Do we want a vision of citizenship so contingent that
someone who is deemed worthy at one stage in their life, and who earns citi-
zenship based upon that worthiness, can have it taken away as life intervenes or
as understandings of worthiness change? Such fluid conceptions of citizenship
would leave American citizenship generally uncertain—and not just for those
who acquired it at some point after birth—and as such must be considered with
apprehension.
The DREAMers have been able to use the discourse of worthiness to
advance a difficult political cause, and they are fighting to extend that success
to others. While they have also done something radical and laudable by
expanding the idea of citizenship itself, an over-emphasis on worthiness has the
danger of using the inspiring efforts of this exceptional movement to justify
exclusion, and even vilification, of those who fall short of the ideal.
291 The National Institute of Justice cites two studies showing that between 60 and 75% of
felons have not found employment within one year of completing their sentences. Research
on Reentry and Employment, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/corrections
/reentry/employment.htm#noteReferrer1 (last modified Apr. 3, 2013).
292 The similarity in discourse between these disparate contexts—the citizenship prospects
of immigrants and the rights of existing citizens—calls to mind Kevin Johnson’s thesis from
the Magic Mirror: “harsh treatment of noncitizens reveals just how this society views citi-
zens of color.” Johnson, supra note 176, at 1116.
